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ABSTRACT
Poker,  especially on-line poker, is a game of  skill and  chance that requires constant and
rapid decision making under varying levels of risk and uncertainty.  Poker playing skill
encompasses both  technical  and  emotional  elements.  In  poker,  it  is  possible  to  acquire
enough  experience  and  skill to  win  money  in  the  long  run. Yet every  poker  player,
regardless of his/her skill, occasionally loses. Poor, “out-of-control” poker decision making
due to negative emotions – typically elicited by monetary losses – is commonly known as
tilting and often results in superfluous losses.
The  aim  of  this  thesis  was  to  evaluate  psychological  and  physiological  emotional
processes  associated  with  poker decision  making.  Studies  I–III  were  based  on
Internet-questionnaire data. Study I (N=60) was qualitative, and Studies II (N=354) and III
(N=417)  were correlative.  The emphasis  here was on exploring the underpinnings of the
tilting phenomenon and the differences in emotion regulation abilities between experienced
and  inexperienced  poker  players.  In  Study  IV  (N=29),  psychophysiological  reactivity
(electrodermal  activity;  EDA) was  measured in  a  laboratory  setting  while participants
played the No Limit Texas Hold'em (NLHE) poker variant on a computer.
Overall, the results suggest that tilting behavior is instigated by loss-induced feelings of
injustice/unfairness (moral indignation). These feelings are also associated with chasing
behavior, where players attempt irrationally to regain the money that they feel is rightfully
theirs.  The  aftermath  of  tilting  was  characterized  by  reports  of  sleeping  problems and
rumination  over lost  resources  (Study I).  A higher tendency to experience loss-induced
negative  feelings  was associated  with  a higher  reported  severity  of tilting  (Study  III).
Experienced  players,  when compared  with  inexperienced  ones,  exhibited  a  more
mature/impassive disposition  towards  losing  and tilting (Studies  I–III),  engaged in less
self-rumination  and  more  self-reflection,  and  made  normatively  better poker  decisions
(Study II).  However,  surprisingly,  experienced players also reported more severe tilting
(Study III). The EDA elicited while participants played poker on a computer was associated
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with various poker  decisions (actions): Pre-decision EDA levels increased in the order of
folding, calling and betting/raising. Furthermore, actions taken with strong and weak poker
hands  elicited  higher  EDA  compared  with  actions  taken  with  poker hands  of
medium/uncertain strength (Study IV).
The results from Studies I–III shed light on the associations between poker experience,
emotion regulation abilities (“mental skills”)  and tilting behavior.  The results from Study
IV allow for situating the game of poker within the theoretical framework of economic and
neuroscientific theories of emotions and decision making by demonstrating  that the  EDA
associated with NLHE decision making conceivably indexes the anticipated utility of  the
decisions.
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TIIVISTELMÄ
Pokeri  –  erityisesti  nettipokeri  –  on  taitoon  ja  sattumaan  perustuva peli,  joka edellyttää
jatkuvasti nopeaa  ja riskialtista päätöksentekoa.  Pelitaitoon liittyy  pokerissa sekä  teknisiä
että  emotionaalisia osa-alueita.  Pokerissa  pelitaitoja voi  kehittää,  ja  pelaaja voi  jäädä
voitolle pitkällä  aikavälillä.  Jokainen  pokerinpelaaja  taidostaan riippumatta  kuitenkin
häviää  ajoittain.  Tilttaamisella  viitataan  hallitsemattomaan  ja heikkoon  päätöksentekoon,
joka liittyy tyypillisesti tappioiden aiheuttamiin negatiivisiin emootioihin.
Tämän  väitöskirjatyön tavoitteena oli  arvioida psykologisten ja  fysiologisten
emotionaalisten  prosessien yhteyttä päätöksentekoon  pokerissa.  Tutkimukset  I–III
perustuivat  Internet-kyselytutkimusaineistoihin.  Tutkimus  I  (N=60)  oli  kvalitatiivinen ja
Tutkimukset  II  (N=354)  ja  III  (N=417)  olivat  korrelatiivisia.  Erityisesti  tarkasteltiin
tilttaamisen  syntymekanismeja  ja  kokeneiden  ja  kokemattomien  pelaajien  välisiä  eroja
emootioiden säätelykyvyissä. Tutkimuksessa IV (N=29) psykofysiologista toiminnallisuutta
(ihon  sähkönjohtavuus;  EDA;  electrodermal  response)  mitattiin laboratorio-olosuhteissa
koehenkilöiden pelatessa tietokoneella No Limit Texas Hold'em (NLHE) -pokerivarianttia.
Tulosten  perusteella  tilttaaminen  käynnistyy häviötilanteessa epä-
oikeudenmukaisuuden/epäreiluuden (moraalisen raivon) tunteiden johdosta.  Nämä tunteet
ilmenevät usein  jahtaamisen yhteydessä, jolloin pelaajat yrittävät  irrationaalisesti voittaa
oikeudenmukaisuuden nimissä takaisin aiemmin häviämänsä rahan. Tilttaamisen jälkitilassa
raportoitiin  univaikeuksia ja  menetettyjen  resurssien  märehtimistä (Tutkimus  I).  Mitä
vahvempi  taipumus  pelaajilla oli  kokea  häviöiden  aiheuttamia  negatiivisia  tunteita,  sitä
vakavammin  he raportoivat  tilttaavansa  (Tutkimus  III). Kokeneet  pelaajat  suhtautuivat
kokemattomiin verrattuna emotionaalisesti  kypsemmin rahan häviämiseen  ja tilttaamiseen
(Tutkimukset  I–III).  Kokeneet  pelaajat  olivat  lisäksi  kokemattomiin  verrattuna
taipuvaisempia  itsereflektioon,  vähemmän  taipuvaisia  märehtimiseen  ja  normatiivisesti
parempia  pokeripäätöksenteossa  (Tutkimus  II).  Kokeneet  pelaajat  myös  yllättäen
raportoivat  tilttaavansa  kokemattomia  vakavammin (Tutkimus III).  Tietokonepokeripelin
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aikana  mitattu  EDA liittyi  ennakoidulla  tavalla  erityyppisiin  pokeripäätöksiin.
Päätöksentekoa edeltänyt  EDAn taso kasvoi järjestyksessä kippaaminen  (engl.  folding),
maksaminen  (engl.  calling),  ja  panostaminen/korottaminen  (engl.  betting/raising).  Lisäksi
havaittiin, että vahvoilla ja heikoilla pokerikäsillä tehdyt päätökset liittyivät korkeampaan
EDAn tasoon kuin keskivahvoilla pokerikäsillä tehdyt päätökset (Tutkimus IV).
Tutkimuksien I–III  tulokset  valottavat tilttaamisen  syntymekanismeja ja
pokerikokemuksen  ja  emootioiden  säätelyn  välistä  yhteyttä.  Tutkimuksen  IV  tulokset
osoittavat,  että  NLHE-pelin  aikana mitattu  EDA heijastaa  mahdollisesti  pokeripäätösten
ennakoitua  hyötyä,  ja  siten  mahdollistavat  pokeripelin  tarkastelun  neurotieteellisten  ja
taloustieteellisten teorioiden viitekehyksessä.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND POKER GLOSSARY
BAD BEAT Losing in a situation where losing is perceived to be highly 
improbable
BLINDS Forced bets (small and big blind) that are placed into the pot by 
players before play begins
CALL Matching a bet or a raise made by another player
CHECK Declining to make a bet, but retaining the right to call or raise bets or
raises made by subsequent players
FLOP The first three cards dealt face-up to the board in Hold'em poker
EDA Electrodermal Activity
EUT Expected Utility Theory
EU Expected Utility
EV Expected Value
FISH A bad poker player (“easy money”)
fMRI Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
FOLD To discard one’s cards and give up playing during the current hand, 
thereby forfeiting interest in the current pot 
FREEROLL A poker  tournament with a free entry (can refer to  both SNGs and 
MTTs)
HAND Depending on the context, a Hold'em poker hand may refer to either 
(a) a single round of game play; the period beginning when cards are 
dealt and ending with the showdown (revealing of players’ cards and 
deciding the winner of a given hand), (b) the two cards dealt to each 
player at the beginning of each round of game play (also referred to 
as the starting hand or hole cards), or c) the best five-card 
combination that can be formed using the hole cards and the 
community cards (see NLHE)
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LMM Linear Mixed Models
MTT*number* Multi-Table  Tournament  –  A poker  tournament with usually more  
than 40 participants, and at least 4 tables, with a buy-in amount 
indicated by the number
NLHE No Limit Texas Hold'em – A variation of the standard game of poker.
Any game of poker is a card game involving betting whereby the 
winner is determined based on the ranking of their cards. NLHE 
consists of two cards being dealt face down to each player, and then 
five community cards – cards that can be used by all players – being 
placed face-up. Players have the option to check, call, bet, raise, or 
fold either prior to the flop (pre-flop), on the flop, on the turn, and 
on the river
NL*number* No Limit Hold’em game, with a maximum buy-in amount indicated 
by the number
PEET Perceived Effect of Experience on Tilting (scale)
PES Poker Experience Scale
PGSI Problem Gambling Severity Index
PLO*number* Pot Limit Omaha game (poker variant), with a maximum buy-in 
amount indicated by the number
POT Sum of money (or chips) that players have waged during a single 
hand (definition a) of game play
PRE-FLOP The period beginning with the dealing of cards and ending with the 
flop in Hold'em poker
RAISE Increasing the size of a bet required to stay in the pot, forcing all 
subsequent players to call the new amount (or raise more) if they 
wish to remain in
RIVER The fifth and final card dealt face-up to the board in Hold'em poker
SCR Skin Conductance Response
SD Standard Deviation
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SL Sensitivity to Losses (scale)
SMH Somatic Marker Hypothesis
SNG*number* Sit and Go – A small tournament, with usually less than 30 
participants, buy-in amount indicated by the number. A typical Sit  
and Go -tournament starts with a single table, and either 6 
(short-handed Sit and Go), 9 or 10 (full-table Sit and Go) players. 
SOGS South Oaks Gambling Screen
ST Severity of Tilting (scale)
STACK The money (or chips) currently held in play by a player
SUCK OUT A strong poker hand (definition c)  getting beat by another player’s 
hand because they hit their draw (= an unfinished hand that needs one
or more cards to turn into a made hand)
TURN The fourth card dealt face-up to the board in Hold'em poker
WSOP World Series of Poker
MISC. h = hearts, s = spades, c = clubs, d = diamonds; As, Kh, Qc, Jd, Ts, 
9h, 8d = Ace of spades, King of hearts, Queen of clubs, Jack of 
diamonds, Ten of spades, Nine of hearts, Eight of diamonds
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FOREWORD
I feel that this thesis benefits from a short foreword clarifying my motivation for studying
emotions and decision making in poker,  as  this particular topic  may appear to be slightly
esoteric for an academic dissertation.
I have played poker on-line since 2006, and I have been dealt more than 2 million poker
hands.  However,  I  have  never  been  quite  able  to  move  up  in  stakes  to  where  they
colloquially say the “real money is made”.  Although,  in my  defense, I am still winning.
According to our own Poker Experience Scale (PES; presented in Study II), I score 20 out
of 30 points maximum.
I am quite confident in saying that one of the key reasons for me for failing to win at the
higher  stakes  were those  (fortunately)  transient  episodes  of  formidable frustration
(sometimes even rage), induced most often by what I felt was “bad luck” or “ridiculously
prolonged” losing streaks. During these episodes of tilting, I lost control and thereby also
superfluous amounts of money – sometimes more than a thousand euros in one session. As
a student, it was not pleasant. I remember thinking to myself: “I'm smart, and I don't really
enjoy losing. Pretty interesting that this is still happening to me”.
I knew about tilting – it was  quite hard not to, since it was so obviously a prevalent
phenomenon often talked about in on-line poker forums. This suggested it was not just me,
who tilted every now and then.  It  appeared that basically  every single person who had
played poker for more than just a few hands  also had experienced tilting. In fact, some
players'  stories  about  tilting  and  what  resulted  thereafter were  quite gruesome  (not  all
stories ended with said players only losing all their money – which in itself, for some, was
quite  a significant amount).  Surprisingly, despite my best efforts, I could find only a few
relevant empirical peer-reviewed reports concerning  tilting.  In fact,  there  seemed to be a
gap in scientific literature with almost no studies assessing emotions and decision making
in poker, in general. With tilting, I took the high road: If you can't beat it...study it!
Thus,  the  starting  point  for  observing  the  phenomena  of  interest  in  this  thesis was
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founded primarily on anecdotal evidence and personal experience. When there does not yet
exist  a  substantial  corpus  of  empirical  evidence  on a  subject  matter  of  prevalence  and
interest, it is great fun and intellectually challenging to contribute to building one. 
This thesis is the modest beginning of my contribution.
Wishing everybody the best of luck,
Jussi Palomäki
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1 BACKGROUND
1.1 The game of poker
Poker is a  genre of  card games involving betting  and individualistic play, by which the
winners are determined based on the rankings of their card-combinations. There are several
poker game variants, which differ in their respective rules and betting procedures. Poker is
currently arguably one of the most recognizable card game ”brands” in the world,  whose
popularity started first increasing in the 1970s.  This was likely due to the introduction of
the  World Series of Poker (WSOP)  -tournament series, and,  in general, development of
modern tournament poker play in American casinos.  In fact, some of the earliest WSOP
champions  (such as Doyle Brunson) are  still  regarded as  highly  influential icons  in the
poker communities around the world (e.g., Brunson & Cochran, 2009; for the general rules
of poker, see Krieger & Bykofsky, 2006).
In  the  last  decade,  the  popularity  of  poker  –  especially the  variant  No Limit  Texas
Hold'em (NLHE) – has further increased exceedingly (for the general rules of NLHE, see
Harrington, 2004; Sklansky & Miller, 2006). The latest increase in popularity is commonly
attributed to  at  least  two factors:  i)  Emergence of  Internet  poker,  and ii)  the so called
Moneymaker -effect:  Chris Moneymaker  –  then  an accountant by profession –  won the
2003 WSOP Main Event (a NLHE tournament) for $2.5 million, after having first won his
Main Event entry ticket (worth $10 thousand) from an on-line tournament that cost $40 to
enter.  He  then became  the  new  ”poster  boy”  for  poker,  thereby launching  a  new
international  ”poker  craze”  (Moneymaker,  2006).  Poker has  since  gained  broad  media
visibility  in many countries,  which is  currently reflected in dozens of television programs
exclusively dedicated to it  (e.g., Bjerg, 2011)1.  Currently, poker is played  professionally,
semi-professionally or recreationally by millions of players world-wide in various gaming
venues,  most  notably  on-line  (Fiedler  & Wilcke,  2012;  Harrington  &  Robertie,  2010;
1 Another factor  in the increase of poker's popularity  is the  development of the ”pocket cam” – i.e., the  
small concealed camera that displays the cards players are holding to television viewers.
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Mitrovic & Brown, 2009; O'Leary & Carroll, 2012).
Despite the popularity of poker, the range of scientific research focusing on its various
aspects is  relatively scarce.  However,  in  the last  few years there has  been an apparent
accumulation  of  empirical  evidence  concerning  diverse  aspects  of  the  game  (e.g.,
Abarnabel & Bernhard, 2012; Bjerg, 2010; Hopley et al., 2010, 2012; Kallinen et al., 2009;
Linnet et  al.,  2010, 2012;  Siler,  2010;  Wolkomir,  2012; Wood et al.,  2007,  2008).  This
chapter  explores literature  on the topic of  emotional processes in the game of poker.  The
interplay between emotions and decision making in poker is evaluated from psychological,
sociological and neuroscientific perspectives. Although the emphasis will be on  literature
concerning  the  associations  between  emotions  and  decision  making  in  poker, the
underpinnings of poker  experience and  skill will  also be examined  –  these are relevant
concepts especially in Studies I–III.
1.2 Experience and skill in poker
All  poker  game  variants  are  games  of  skill  and  chance,  where  players  need  to  make
decisions  of  investment  constantly  and  rapidly.  Decision  making  in  poker  generally
involves varying levels of risk and uncertainty – betting in poker is usually associated with
substantial  outcome  variability.  Moreover,  players  often  do  not  have  access  to  all  the
relevant  information  with  which  to  make  a  decision.  In  other  words,  poker  can  be
characterized  as  a  financial  decision  making  game involving  the  analysis  of  imperfect
information2 and constant risk taking (Chen & Ankenman, 2006; Sklansky & Malmuth,
1999).
The interplay between  skill  and  chance  in poker is a topic of ongoing debate (Bjerg,
2010; Croson et al., 2008; Dedonno & Detterman, 2008; Fiedler & Rock, 2009; Hannum &
Cabot, 2009; Levitt & Miles, 2011; Meyer et al., 2013; see also Zhou et al., 2012). It is not
yet well-established to which extent poker can be considered a game of skill as opposed to
2 By contrast, in  games of  perfect information  (e.g. Chess),  players have at all times access to  all the  
relevant information with which to make a decision.
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a game of chance. However, there appears to be a consensus on the fact that, in general, it is
possible for players to acquire enough skill to win money in the long run by playing poker
(to become winning players)3. Thus, poker games can be differentiated from games of pure
chance (e.g., roulette and bingo), and other games of skill and chance (e.g., blackjack and
craps), in which the element of skill cannot be applied to the point of becoming a winning
player (Bjerg, 2010).
Poker playing  experience relates to a player's  level of knowledge and understanding
concerning  various aspects of the game.  Arguably, the more experience a player has, the
more skilled s/he  will  be,  and the more likely s/he  will  also be a winning player.  This
contention is supported by empirical evidence. For example, in a laboratory  experiment,
teaching  naïve  participants  poker  game  strategic  concepts  resulted  in  their improved
success  in  the  game  (Dedonno  & Detterman,  2008;  see  also  Cabot  & Hannum,  2005;
Turner & Fritz, 2001). The success of self-defined professional and amateur poker players
at  the  WSOP has  been  evaluated,  and the  results  suggest  that  professional  players  are
consistently more  successful than amateur players (Croson et al.,  2008; Levitt & Miles,
2010).  Furthermore,  experienced  poker  players  were  better  able  to  estimate  betting
probabilities in poker  decision making situations,  as compared with inexperienced ones
(Linnet et al., 2010, 2012). Finally, there exists abundant anecdotal evidence supporting the
view of poker as a game where one's skills can constantly be improved (e.g., Angelo, 2007;
Harrington,  2004;  Sklansky  &  Malmuth,  1999;  Tendler,  2011,  2013).  The  evidence
presented above resonates also with the common saying: Poker takes a minute to learn, and
a lifetime to master. 
Notwithstanding, most poker players lose money in the long run by playing poker (most
players  are  losing players) – some  probably  even in  spite  of  their  high level  of  poker
experience (see Hayano, 1982; Lesieur, 1984; Sharkscopers, 2009). It is also worth noting
3 By virtue of this fact, poker can arguably also be defined purely as a game of skill. Due to statistical 
variation in  betting  results  (i.e.,  chance),  a  winning  player  will  occasionally lose  money.  S/he  will,  
however, by definition (if s/he remains a winning player) never end up losing money in the long run. That 
is to say, there is no chance for a winning player to not eventually end up winning. Correspondingly, there
is no chance for a losing player not to eventually end up losing. Thus, it is theoretically possible in poker 
to have enough skill to never end up losing (in the long run).  
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that in  a  recent  laboratory experiment  about poker decision making, experienced players
did  not  outperform inexperienced ones  (Meyer  et  al.,  2013). Moreover,  due  to  lack  of
consistent empirical evidence, it is difficult to estimate the exact ratio of winning players to
losing players.  Depending on the source of estimation, the overall percentage of winning
poker players  (i.e., those players who are  skilled  enough to win money in the long run)
ranges from 5 % to 30 % (e.g., Browne, 1989; Sharkscopers, 2009; Siler, 2010). It should
also be noted that some poker players, despite being unskilled and losing players in the long
run, might have ended up winning money in a given period of time simply by chance alone
– and  vice versa  for  skilled  and  winning  poker players.  However, in contrast,  the overall
percentage of, for example, “winning roulette players” is necessarily 0 %. Essentially, these
contentions  illustrate the complications in assessing what specifically makes someone a
skilled player, and what are the relevant factors in apprehending the underpinnings of poker
playing experience.
1.2.1 Aspects of poker playing skill
The concept of poker playing skill encompasses both technical and emotional aspects. This
view is supported by empirical evidence (Browne, 1989; Morgan, 2013; see also Radburn
&  Horsley,  2011;  Rosenthal,  1995),  and  a  strong  corpus  of  anecdotal  evidence  (e.g.,
Angelo, 2007;  Hilger & Taylor, 2007;  Parke et al., 2005; Tendler, 2011, 2013). Technical
poker skill  aspects refer to, for example, knowledge about betting strategy (mathematical
reasoning  for  maximizing  betting  profitability),  bankroll management (mathematical
reasoning for maintaining enough money available  for playing in  relation to the stakes
played), and table/game selection (ability to recognize and select the most profitable poker
tables/games to play on – that is, the tables/games where the level of competition is not too
high).  Emotional poker skill  aspects refer to abilities in  regulating emotions induced by
elements  of  the  game,  thereby maintaining  a  robust  quality  of poker  decision  making.
Colloquially, emotion regulation abilities in poker are often referred to as  mental game
skills (Tendler, 2011, 2013).
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1.2.2 Tilting
Losing control due to strong negative emotions elicited by elements of the game, and the
resulting reduced quality of poker decision making, is commonly known as  tilting.  Game
elements that often elicit negative emotions and induce tilting include (but are not limited
to) i) losing in a situation where losing is perceivably highly improbable (encountering a
bad beat),  ii) prolonged series of losses (losing streaks),  and iii)  factors external to the
game mechanics, such as fatigue, or “needling”  by other players. Evidence suggests that
tilting is a  very prominent  and common cause of superfluous monetary losses for many
poker  players  (Browne, 1989;  Hayano, 1982; Tendler,  2011).  Superfluous losses during
tilting often result from chasing (of one's losses), which refers to out-of-control gambling
behavior where players attempt to quickly win back the money that was previously lost (see
Dickerson & O'Connor,  2006;  Lesieur,  1984;  Toneatto,  1999,  2002).  Tilting  essentially
represents an overt condition where emotions have a direct and detrimental influence on
poker decision making. 
Bad beats and losing streaks often elicit negative feelings of frustration, injustice, moral
indignation/anger,  helplessness  and  shame  (Browne, 1989; Rosenthal, 1995;  Rosecrance,
1986; Tendler, 2011; Yi & Kanetkar, 2011). It has also been suggested that bad beats are in
discrepancy with players' perceptions of “fair chance” (Rosenthal, 1995; see also Lesieur,
1984). Thus, chasing might in some cases reflect gambling behavior driven by a sense of
moral justification,  whereby players attempt to “make  things right” by winning back that
which “rightfully belonged to them in the first place”.  Tilting might in certain situations
bear  a  resemblance  to pathological  (i.e.,  disordered) gambling  behavior.  Pathological
gambling  is commonly  associated with chasing behavior  (Lesieur, 1984;  Toneatto, 1999,
2002;  see  also  McCormack  &  Griffiths,  2012)  and  distorted  cognitions  (Barrault  &
Varescon, 2013; MacKay & Hodgins, 2012; Moore et al., 2012; see also Joukhador et al.,
2004). However, due to the high prevalence of tilting, there is no a priori reason to presume
that tilting is by and of itself pathological.
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There  is  reason  to  presume  that  especially  losing  players  –  who  are  also  often
inexperienced – are more susceptible to negative emotions elicited by significant monetary
poker losses. For example, Siler (2010) analyzed a substantial sample of over 28 million
NLHE poker  hands  assessing  the  betting  strategies of  both  winning  and  losing  poker
players. He discovered that,  on average, winning players bet more frequently with strong
hands, but play and win fewer hands in total, as compared with losing players. These results
indicate that winning players win the majority of the  large pots by  betting with strong
hands, while losing players win the majority of the  small pots,  but lose the large pots by
calling too  often  (see  poker  glossary).  Thus,  in  NLHE,  losing  players  encounter  large
monetary losses more frequently than winning players.  These large monetary losses often
elicit strong  negative emotions, which, in turn,  conceivably  predispose losing players to
tilting and prolonged periods of detrimental decision making.
Some evidence also suggests that experienced players differ from inexperienced ones in
their emotion regulation abilities by being better able to regulate negative emotions elicited
by various game elements, such as significant monetary losses.  This is  arguably a skill
learned  through  experience.  For  example,  a  profound  understanding  of  relevant
mathematical concepts,  such as  variance,  might  be related to  a  more ”mature” attitude
towards encountering ”bad luck” (”there is no luck, there is only  variance”; e.g.,  Bjerg,
2010;  Browne,  1989;  Parke  et  al.,  2005;  see  also  McCormack  &  Griffiths,  2012;
McCormack et  al., 2013;  Morgan, 2013).  It  is  possible that  experienced players have a
different  conceptualization  of  ”luck”  as  compared  with inexperienced ones.  This  might
have an  effect  on  the  intensity  and  frequency  of  negative  emotions  induced  by  game
elements, and consequently, on the decision making abilities of the two kinds of players.
For example, in general, experienced players might regard bad luck impassively as “merely
variance”, whereas inexperienced players might regard it as befallen injustice, which in turn
elicits  a  negative  emotional  reaction.  Therefore,  it  is  also  reasonable  to  propose  that
experienced  poker  players,  as  compared  with inexperienced  ones, are  less  prone to
“dwelling on the negative”,  or  self-rumination, such as constantly second guessing their
actions or displaying a detrimental inability to “let  go” of unfavorable consequences of
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decisions.  Similarly, experienced players, as compared with inexperienced ones, might be
more  predisposed to  self-reflection,  which refers to  a  benign self-contemplative style of
introspection,  characterized  by  genuine  curiosity  towards  one's  feelings  and  thoughts
(Elliott & Coker, 2008; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999)4.
However, due to natural statistical variation in poker game results, every poker player –
regardless of how skilled and experienced they are – occasionally loses. Evidence suggests
that tilting is a prevailing phenomenon among both inexperienced and experienced players
(even  professional  players;  Angelo,  2007;  Tendler,  2011). There  are  perhaps  no  other
environments of asset investing that require as rapid financial decision making as those
seen in on-line poker. For instance, active stock traders might be required to decide between
various investment prospects on an hourly, or even a minute -scale, but active on-line poker
players often make several investment decisions within seconds. Furthermore, in poker, the
number of decisions to be made increases with the amount of tables the player is playing
on.  On-line, a player may choose to play on just one table, but it is not unheard of for
players to have as many as 24 virtual tables open at the same time (e.g., Rhodes, 2010).
On-line poker is a micro-level economic decision making environment where the quality of
decisions should be maintained every second, sometimes even in the face of frustrating and
arduous  – yet statistically inevitable –  losing streaks. Thus,  a  successful winning poker
player needs not only to have substantial knowledge of the technical aspects of the game,
but also proficient abilities in emotion regulation.
1.3  Methods and models in  the  field  of  emotions and decision
making
The contentions  presented  above  indicate that  poker  is  a  decision making environment
whose various elements constantly elicit strong emotions in a social context. As such, poker
provides a rich context within which the association between emotions and decision making
4 Both  self-rumination  and  self-reflection  are  components  of  the  “Private  self-consciousness”  -scale,  
developed by Fenigstein et al. (1975).
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can be studied. 
According to early decision making theories, individuals were assumed to evaluate by
rational calculation – “dispassionately” – all possible consequences of their decisions, and
to select the actions that maximized the utility of those consequences. However, the early
theories have since been shown to be insufficient in accurately describing human decision
making behavior.  For example, according to prospect theory  (introduced by Tversky and
Kahneman; e.g., 1974) human decision making is subject to various cognitive biases, and
evaluation  of  utility  is  better  characterized  as  a  “reference-dependent”  process: In  a
decision making situation, possible final outcomes are interpreted as either wins or losses,
depending on what is experienced as the status quo – which can be construed roughly as the
“current  level  of  wealth”. Humans  also generally  exhibit  in  their  decision  making  a
tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains (i.e., loss aversion), which could not
be  explained  by the early decision making theories.  Loss aversion,  in turn, relates to the
tendency  of  emotionally  experiencing  losses  “more  strongly”  than  gains  (Tversky  &
Kahneman, 1974, 1986).
For example, suppose that two poker players have won 80 and 120 euros during separate
poker  sessions,  and both decide  to  have  a  short  break.  Afterwards  they  return  to  play
another  session.  Prospect  theory postulates that  at  this  time both players  set  “reference
points” at 80 and 120 euros, respectively. During the second session, the former player goes
on to  win 20 more  euros and the latter  one to  lose 20.  This results in a net profit of 100
euros for both players – but conceivably also in a negative emotion-driven incentive for the
latter player to “get even”.
Currently, abundant evidence suggests a fundamental connection between emotion- and
decision making processes (e.g.,  Bechara & Damasio,  2005;  Clore & Huntsinger,  2007;
Damasio, 1994/2006, 1999; Dickerson & O'Connor, 2006; Lewis et al., 2010; Loewenstein
& Lerner, 2003; Slovic et al., 2005, 2007; Vohs et al., 2007; see also Rottenstreich & Hsee,
2001). It has been shown, for example, that the destruction of emotion-related brain areas
can lead to severe decision making deficits in everyday life (Bechara, 2003, 2005; Bechara
et al., 1994; Damasio, 1994/2006). The effect of emotions or affect on decision making is
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also expressed in various models, such as the affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2005, 2007) and
risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al., 2001), both of which emphasize the role of
emotions or affect as implicit or explicit “motivators” of behavior that guide decisions in
uncertain environments. For example, feeling anger or fear predicts lower and higher risk
assessments, respectively (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
1.3.1 Psychophysiology of human emotions and decision making
The psychophysiology of human decision making under risk and uncertainty can be
assessed by methods such as brain imaging (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging
[fMRI]), or measuring electrodermal activity (EDA). fMRI enables  assessing the neural
correlates of decision making by measuring participants' brain responses (the
blood-oxygen-level dependent -signal) during performing various decision making tasks.
For example, rejecting unfair offers in the ultimatum game was associated with activity in
the  anterior  insula,  whereas  accepting  fair  offers  was  associated  with  activity  in  the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Sanfey et al., 2003). In a decision making task where choice
options  were  framed  as  either  losses  or  gains,  activity  in  the  amygdala  was  higher  in
participants who were more susceptible to deviations from “rational” choices (De Martino
et al., 2006).
Changes in EDA (tonic skin conductance level, or phasic skin conductance responses,
SCRs)  relate  to  changes  in  eccrine  sweating,  which  in  turn  relates to  activity  in  the
sympathetic  nervous  system  (Dawson  et  al.,  2000).  EDA  is  a  consequential
psychophysiological  index  of  arousal,  and  several studies using the picture-viewing
paradigm have shown that EDA is highly correlated with self-reported emotional arousal.
EDA is often employed as an index of the intensity (although not the valence or “tone”) of
affect, and as such, has become a widely used tool in assessing affective processes and their
association with decision making (e.g.,  Bechara  & Damasio, 2005; Dawson  et al.,  2011;
Figner & Murphy, 2011; Kallinen et al., 2009; Ravaja et al., 2006; however EDA can be an
indicator of other, non-affective, processes as well: e.g., Lang et al., 1993).
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Studies using the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, 2005; Bechara et al., 1994) have shown
that healthy subjects exhibit SCRs to both the outcomes of their decisions (either wins or
losses) and the anticipation of making a decision.  These anticipatory reactions suggest an
indexing of emotional arousal prior to decision making, reflecting anticipated utility (which
can be either positive or negative) of a given decision. Based on these findings, among
others, Damasio and colleagues (Damasio, 1994/2006; see also Bechara & Damasio, 2005)
formulated the somatic marker hypothesis  (SMH): Through associative learning, mental
images of options in  a decision making situation become marked by somatic or bodily
states, linked directly or indirectly to positive and negative feelings (”gut feelings”). 
Poker is a decision making environment where players are constantly required to rapidly
assess the profitability of taking one of five actions: folding, checking, calling, betting and
raising.  Depending on the situation, each action is assumably associated with a different
measure of anticipated utility. That is  to say,  some actions are generally estimated to be
more  profitable  than  others. Hence,  the  SMH  framework  has  relevance  in  also
understanding poker decision making processes. EDA can be employed to index emotional
arousal associated with various poker actions. Thus, EDA can arguably also be employed as
an  index  of  differing  levels  of  anticipated  utility  associated  with  said  actions. It  is
appropriate  to  suggest  that  various  poker  decision  making  constituents are  distinctly
reflected in psychophysiological reactivity (emotional arousal), as measured by EDA.
These contentions are sensible also within the context of normative economic decision
theories, such as the expected utility theory (EUT; Schoemaker, 1982; see also Glimcher et
al., 2004). According to the EUT,  poker  players  are  assumed to subjectively evaluate the
expected  (anticipated)  utility (EU) of a poker action in a given situation. The EU of an
action corresponds to the sum of utility of all possible consequences of said action weighted
by their probability.  In general, the EU of calling is always contingent on the preceding
actions taken by other players. By calling, a player can only expect to win that which was
previously wagered by someone else. However, by betting or raising, the player can not
only choose the size of his/her bet or raise, but also has the option of re-raising, should any
opponent  decide  to  raise  or  re-raise  the  original  bet.  It is  thus  generally reasonable  to
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presume that, if a player chooses to bet or raise, the preceding calculation of the EU has
yielded a higher value, as compared with calling.
Although  the  mathematical  expected  value  (EV) of  folding  is  exactly  0,  the  EU of
folding is arguably dependent on the amount of money/chips previously wagered in the pot.
For example, if a player has invested a substantial amount of money/chips – that are now in
the  pot  –  prior  to  folding,  s/he  might  experience  folding  as  “losing  the  pot”  and thus
receiving negative utility. However, if little or no money/chips has been invested prior to
folding (which is often the case), there is reason to presume the preceding calculation of EU
for folding has yielded a value close to 0.
1.4 The aims of the present thesis
The general aim of this thesis was to assess how emotional processes – both psychological
and physiological –  are associated with  decision making  in the game of poker.  In other
words, this thesis primarily sought to begin producing new scientific knowledge concerning
the multifaceted phenomenon of emotions and decision making in poker, as there seemed to
be an obvious gap in current scientific understanding on the subject.
Studies I–III generally aimed at assessing the underpinnings of poker experience and
skill,  and their  associations with players'  various emotional characteristics and behavior
(with emphasis on tilting), as well as poker decision making. Study IV generally aimed at
assessing  psychophysiological  reactivity  during  poker  decision  making,  and  thereby
situating the  game  within  the  theoretical  framework  of  neuroscientific  and  economic
theories of human decision making  and emotions.  The specific aims of Studies I–IV are
elaborated on below.
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Study I
Study  I was  exploratory by nature.  The specific aims were to  assess qualitatively  the
following:
i) Phenomenology and aetiology of losing and tilting in on-line poker.
ii) Differences in experiences of losing and tilting between experienced and inexperienced
poker players.
These aims – and the qualitative method – were chosen for the following reasons:
1)  Previous  empirical  evidence  concerning  tilting  was  scarce,  and  thus  no  previously
presented and/or validated tools for measuring tilting existed.
2)  Anecdotal  evidence  alone  was  not  sufficient  for understanding and  defining
unambiguously the underpinnings of tilting behavior.
3) The  qualitative  method is  consequential  in  order  to  produce  new phenomenological
knowledge – i.e., knowledge about the experiential constituents of a specific phenomenon,
namely losing and tilting in poker.
Study II
Inspired partly by the results of Study I, Study II aimed to:
i) Evaluate  the  associations  between  poker  playing  experience,  specific emotional
characteristics (self-reflection and self-rumination;  Elliott & Coker, 2008), and a belief in
one's ability to influence luck.
ii) Determine if the level of poker playing experience predicts mathematical accuracy in
poker decision making tasks.
It was hypothesized that participants with more poker experience would:
1) Display a reduced tendency to self-rumination and a higher tendency to self-reflection.
2) Be less likely to believe they can influence luck.
3) Perform better in the poker decision making tasks.
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Study III
Inspired by the results of Studies I and II, Study III aimed to:
i) Further  explore the  tilting  phenomenon  by  defining  experiential  and  emotional
characteristics (i.e., by constructing scales) that assumably protect participants from tilting
or predispose them to it.
ii) Use these characteristics in predicting participants' severity of tilting.
iii) Provide validation for a previously (in Study II) introduced measure of poker playing
experience, the Poker Experience Scale (PES).
It was hypothesized that: 
1) Participants with more poker experience are more likely to have an impression of having
tilted less severely, as result of accumulating poker experience.
2) Participants with more poker experience tilt less severely.
3) Participants with more poker experience report lower emotional sensitivity to losses (i.e.,
they descry fewer loss-induced negative emotions, such as feelings of injustice, anger or
frustration).
4) Participants with higher emotional sensitivity to losses tilt more severely.
Study IV
The aims of Study IV were partly exploratory. However, two specific hypotheses were
also formulated, inspired by existing models of both neuroscientific and economic theories
of decision making  and emotions.  Based on the underlying  assumptions of the somatic
marker hypothesis (SMH;  Bechara & Damasio, 2005),  and  expected utility theory (EUT;
Schoemaker,  1982),  it  was  presumed that  psychophysiological  reactivity  during playing
NLHE, as measured by EDA, indexes the anticipated utility of various actions. Thus it was
also hypothesized that:
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1) Pre-decision EDA increases in the order of folding (indicating no/low anticipated utility)
<  calling  (indicating some  anticipated  utility)  <  betting  and  raising  (indicating high
anticipated utility).
2) Pre-decision and post-decision EDA increases in the order of actions taken with weak
hands (reflecting anticipation of little or no profit) < actions taken with a medium-strength
hand (or strength is uncertain; reflecting anticipation of an “uncertain” amount of profit) <
actions taken with a strong hand (reflecting anticipation of profit).
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2 SOCIAL CONTEXT OF RESEARCH
For the purpose of the current thesis, it is consequential to understand the societal factors
that influence gambling behavior in Finnish poker players. Thus, the social context within
which the research was carried out needs to be evaluated. This is relevant in interpreting the
results  of Study I  in particular (due to the  qualitative method of  narrative and thematic
analyses; see Data-analyses). By extension, also the results of Studies II and III should be
interpreted within this framework –  these studies were inspired in part by the results of
Study I.
In Finland, poker is not among the most popular forms of gambling (Taskinen, 2007, p.
9).  Still,  there  exists  a  prominent  on-line  poker  subculture,  consisting  of  at  least  three
highly  active poker  communities  and forums constantly organizing social  activities  and
reporting  poker-related  news  (i.e.,  www.pokerisivut.com,  www.pokeritieto.com,  and
www.pokerista.net;  see also  O'Leary  & Carroll,  2012).  According to  some professional
poker players (personal communications), Finnish mainstream media often display lack of
understanding of poker and its subculture,  thereby provoking negative attitudes towards
poker in the general public5. This, in turn, is reflected in a sour  demeanor displayed by
many poker players towards what are perceived as attempts (often by the media) to portray
poker in a ”bad light”. For example, during data gathering of Studies I–III,  many on-line
poker  forum  members  were  suspicious  about  the  ”true”  objectives  of  the  studies  –
presumably,  scientists  studying  poker  are  often viewed  as  part  of  the  social  welfare
establishment, aiming to limit individual freedom in poker playing. 
Despite Finland having a strong gender-egalitarian culture and social history, poker is
without doubt  a male-dominated game.  Furthermore,  Finns are,  in general, influenced by
the Protestant work ethic (Jokinen & Saaristo, 2010). Traditionally, males are also seen as
5 Examples  of  mainstream  news  headlines  seemingly  portraying  poker  in  bad  light  (translated  from  
Finnish):  1)  “Internet  poker  causes  financial  problems  for  young  people”  retrieved  from:  
http://keskustelu.suomi24.fi/node/3309606, 2) “Ministry of health wants to limit Internet poker playing in 
Finland” retrieved from: http://www.iltasanomat.fi/kotimaa/art-1288338415338.html, 3) “Internet poker is
dividing  apart  the  family  of  Ahde”  retrieved  from:  http://www.iltasanomat.fi/kotimaa/art-
1288338743221.html 
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the household breadwinners, which is reflected in  a distinguishable ”male pride” within
social identities.  The Protestant working ethos also manifests itself in the notion that an
individual should always receive a fair/just compensation or acknowledgement for his/her
work  –  i.e.,  a  compensation  for  due  work.  Furthermore,  the  Nordic  welfare  state
amalgamation of social equality and capitalism stresses the ideal that everyone is entitled to
an  ”equal  chance”  of  achieving  a  certain  level  of  well-being,  happiness,  and  financial
agency (Andersen et al., 2007). 
In poker, however, in order for someone to win, someone else has to lose – often in spite
of having played ”by the book”  and to  one's  best abilities. Believing strongly that work
needs to be duly compensated might not resonate with the inherent nature of poker, where
efforts  and skills  are  rewarded only contingently with wins,  and where someone (most
players) always loses. This ruthless logic of poker, which Bjerg (2011) characterizes as a
parody of capitalism, is fundamentally at odds with the values and ethos of the Nordic
welfare state, and its culture of egalitarianism and social care. 
It has been argued that gambling per se is no longer viewed as a violation of a ”decent”
working ethic in capitalist Western economies. This  possibly  relates to people in Western
societies growing increasingly accustomed to recent  societal  developments in capitalism
from industrialist to post-industrialist phase. In the post-industrialist phase, uncertainty and
insecurity  associated with various everyday economic phenomena, such as stock market
fluctuations and general employment status, have become  commonly accepted aspects of
contemporary  ”lifestyles”.  In  other  words,  visiting  casinos,  buying  stocks  and  lottery
tickets,  betting on sports, and, colloquially, rolling the dice every once in a while,  are no
longer seen as morally questionable activities (see Bernhard & Frey, 2007; Bjerg, 2011).
 However,  the above contentions  do not necessarily  hold true for the Nordic welfare
states, which, due to their sizes and social structures, are not typical examples of Western
capitalist economies (Andersen et al., 2007). Finland, in particular, has prominent systems
of  progressive  taxation  and  social  security,  along  with  strict  laws  preserving  workers’
rights. Furthermore, most Finnish poker players have been brought up with the ”ethos of
fair  compensation”,  during the 1980s and 1990s.  Currently,  poker  is  most often played
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on-line, and typical players are male adults in their 20s and early 30s.  Poker is a form of
gambling whereby players can make a living, and thus lends itself to be evaluated, for some
players, as a profession. As such, the game of poker can be viewed as both gambling and
working. Therefore, it can be argued that the ”harshness” inherent in the nature of poker –
where work does not always guarantee reward – is indeed in discrepancy with the ethos of
fairness and equality still prevalent in postmodern Finland.
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3 METHODS
3.1 Study designs and participants
Studies  I–III  were  based  on  data  from  Internet  questionnaires.  Study  I  was primarily
qualitative, and Studies II and III were correlative. In Study IV, a laboratory experiment
was  designed.  In  Studies  I–III,  participants  were  recruited  primarily  through  various
Finnish on-line poker communities (e.g., www.pokerisivut.com, www.pokeritieto.com, and
www.pokerista.net)  by posting invitations on their  web-forums. In addition,  participants
were  recruited  through  social  media  (e.g.,  Facebook  and  various  Internet  Relay  Chat
channels), and by posting invitations on various Finnish student organization email-lists. In
Study IV, participants were recruited primarily by posting invitations on the aforementioned
email-lists. All participants were from Finland and spoke Finnish as  their first language.
Table 1 summarizes participant demographics and study designs in Studies I–IV.
Table 1. Participant demographics and study design in Studies I–IV
Study      N (females) Age range (mean, SD)      Study design
I                 60 (2) 17–41 (27.1, 6)                   Internet questionnaire (qualitative)
II              354 (23)                17–62 (28.4, 7.7)                Internet questionnaire (correlative)
III      417 (31)               16–61 (27.9, 7.45)              Internet questionnaire (correlative)
IV               29 (3)             20–47 (25.1, 5.1)                Laboratory experiment
3.2 Experimental procedures and materials
The ethical guidelines set by the American Psychological Association were  adhered to in
all studies. In Studies I–III, on the questionnaire front page, participants were informed that
their  anonymity  was  guaranteed,  and  that  the  data  would  be  used  only  for  scientific
purposes. In Study IV, participants gave their written informed consent. In Studies I and II,
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participants  were  not  compensated.  In  Study  III,  on  the  questionnaire  front  page,
participants were informed that a price of ten movie tickets (awarded in sets of five, to two
participants)  would  be  drawn  between  participants  who  have  completed the  entire
questionnaire and entered their email addresses,  when prompted  at the end.  Participants
were also informed that the email addresses would be used only to contact them in case of
winning the price, and erased  from the database  thereafter.  In Study IV, all participants
received movie tickets for their participation.
In Study I, abiding by the theoretical viewpoint of narrative psychology (Willig, 2008,
pp. 133–134), participants were instructed to write a story with the following guidelines
(translated from Finnish): 
“Write a story about a period in your life when you have lost a personally significant
amount  of  money  while  playing  on-line  poker  at  home.  Elaborate  especially  on  the
emotions associated with losing: What thoughts occurred, what exactly transpired prior to
losing,  what  you ended  up doing afterwards,  and what  the  emotion  felt  like  precisely.
Describe the situation and all related events freely.
Please write your story below (the length is not limited).” 
After  writing  a  story,  participants'  level  of  poker  experience  was  assessed with  two
questions:  1)  “How  many  years  have  you  played  poker?” and  2)  “What  is  the  rough
estimate of how 
many hands you have played during your life?”.
In  Study  II,  participants  first  filled  the  Self-Rumination-  and  Self-Reflection  scales
(Elliott & Coker, 2008). The Self-Rumination scale consists of 10 7-point Likert items and
measures the individual tendency of not being able to “let go” of negative consequences of
past actions. In other words, self-rumination refers to an individual tendency to “dwell on
the negative”. Example items are: “I often reflect on unfavorable outcomes in my life”, and
“It  is  easy  for  me  to  put  unwanted  thoughts  out  of  mind”  (reverse  coded). The
Self-Reflection  scale  consists  of  12  7-point  Likert  items  and measures  the  individual
tendency of benign, self-contemplative and genuinely curious introspection and analysis of
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one's  feelings.  Example  items are:  “Knowing  myself  is  very  important  to  me”,  and
“Contemplating myself is something I don't do very often” (reverse coded). The items in
both scales were coded from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”. 
After filling the scales, participants undertook two tasks  designed to simulate on-line
poker decision making  (the tasks were designed for the purpose of this study). In these
tasks, participants  were given a textual description of the decision making situation – a
fictitious NLHE game scenario –, and forced to choose between two options/actions (i.e.,
fold or call). Folding was the mathematically correct decision in both tasks. In short, in both
scenarios, the participant is facing an opponent on-line  heads-up  (one versus one).  The
opponent is described as constantly betting or raising all-in (i.e., betting all the money s/he
currently has in play), indicating with an extremely high likelihood that his/her range of
starting hands (the set  of starting hands s/he bets  or raises  with)  for betting or  raising
includes  the  vast  majority  of  NLHE  starting  hands.  Knowing  an  opponent's  range  of
starting hands (and your own starting hand) for a specific action enables a mathematical
calculation of equity (the likelihood of a known starting hand winning against a specified
starting hand range). Thus, participants had enough information to estimate whether folding
or calling is reasonable. Detailed explanations  and mathematical reasoning for the poker
tasks are presented in Appendix 1 in Study II. 
Next,  participants  answered  a  question  concerning  their  belief  in  their  ability  to
influence  luck  (single  forced choice dichotomous question:  “Do you think  luck can  be
influenced?”  Yes/No).  Finally, participants' level of poker experience was measured with
the Poker Experience Scale (PES), which was developed and introduced in this study. PES
consists of three 10-point Likert items: “How many years have you played poker?” (1 =
“less than 1”; 10 = “more than 15”), “At what level of stakes do you usually play?” (1 =
“Freerolls, NL2–5, PLO2–5, SNG1–5, MTT1–5”; 10 = “Above NL600, PLO600, SNG500,
MTT500”), “What is the rough estimate of how many poker hands you have played during
your life?” (1 = “0–50 000”, 10 = “more than 5 million”). Complete coding for PES is
presented  in  Appendix  2  in Study  II  (see  also  poker  abbreviations).  Also  the  poker
experience measure used in Study I was scored according to the scoring of PES, with the
36
exception of using two items instead of three.
In  Study  III,  the  following  four  measures  (scales)  were  used.  Perceived  Effect  of
Experience on Tilting (PEET),  Sensitivity to Losses (SL),  Severity of Tilting (ST),  and
PES. PEET, SL and ST were developed and introduced in this study, based on the results of
Studies I and II. PEET consists of four positively coded 7-point Likert items and measures
the  self-perceived  impression  of  how  accumulating  poker  experience  has  reduced  the
intensity, frequency and perceived harm (i.e., the severity) of tilting.  An example item is:
“The more poker experience I have gained, the less frequently I have tilted”. SL consists of
11  7-point  Likert  items  and  measures  the  extent  to  which  players  experience  negative
emotions (e.g., feelings of injustice, anger and frustration) elicited by losses – i.e.,  their
sensitivity to losses. Example items are: “I feel losing is unfair”, and “Losing is part of the
game” (reverse  coded). All  items  in  PEET and SL were coded from 1  = “completely
disagree” to “7 =  completely agree”.  ST  consists of four Likert items and  measures the
intensity, frequency and perceived harm (the severity) of tilting during the last 6 months of
active poker playing.  Example items are: “On estimate, how many times have you tilted
within your last 6 months of active poker playing?” (1 = “0”, 7 = “more than 10”), and
“When I have tilted (within my last active 6 months of playing), I have managed to quit
playing before the losses have become too big” (reverse coded; 1 = “completely agree”, 7 =
“completely disagree”, 8 = “I have not tilted”).  A definition of  tilting  was presented to
participants prior to answering to PEET and ST. The complete coding for PEET, SL and ST
is presented in Appendix 1 in Study III.
Due to some similarity between the items in PES, PEET and ST, factor analysis was
employed to determine whether these scales represent distinct constructs. The items from
all three scales were pooled  (11 items in total), and an exploratory factor analysis for a
three-factor solution was employed with maximum likelihood extraction and direct oblimin
rotation methods (correlation was assumed between the factors). The first, second and third
factors had eigenvalues of 3.37, 2.85 and 1.41 and explained 30.69 %, 25.96 % and 12.83
% of the variance, respectively. The eigenvalues of the subsequent eight factors were below
0.65.  The factor loadings on the three-factor solution corresponded to the items of PES,
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PEET and ST, suggesting that the scales were distinct constructs (see the Appendix for the
factor loadings table).
The questionnaires used in Studies II and III also included several exploratory measures,
which are not reported here (these were aimed at assessing secondary working hypotheses
unrelated to current ones). Table 2 summarizes the measures used in Studies I–III, including
their inter-item reliability (internal consistency, as measured by Cronbach's alpha).
Table 2. Descriptions of measures used in Studies I–III
Study Measures used Number of items              Cronbach's alpha
I Written story Not applicable Not applicable
Poker experience measure   2 .67
II Poker Experience Scale   3 .80
Self-Rumination scale 10 .91
Self-Reflection scale 12 .88
Poker decision making tasks   2 Not applicable
Belief in luck question   1 Not applicable
III Poker Experience Scale   3 .74
Perceived Effect of Experience   
 on Tilting scale   4 .88
Sensitivity to Losses scale 11 .78
Severity of Tilting scale   4 .80
Note. Bolded measures were used as the primary dependent variables in the study.
In Study IV, participants (novice poker players) played a modified version of NLHE on a
computer against four  artificial intelligence (computer)  opponents, who were “sitting”  at
the same virtual table as the participants.  The PokerTH (www.pokerth.net)  open source
software was used in the experiment. The participants played 128 hands in two identical 
38
sets of 64 hands6. All hands were identical  across participants. There was a break of  five
minutes after the first  set.  After the second set,  Likert-scaled questionnaires and verbal
open-ended questions were used to  evaluate the following:  i) Did  participants notice the
poker game consisted of two identical sets of 64 hands?  ii) How closely did  participants
think the poker game resembled a “normal” poker game (i.e., did participants feel as if the
game was “rigged”)?  iii) What  type of strategy (playing style)  participants used in  the
game?
A  mobile  physiological  data  acquisition  system  (Varioport-B,  Becker  Meditec,
Karlsruhe,  Germany)  was  used  to  record  EDA,  using  a  constant  0.5  V voltage  across
Ag/AgCl electrodes with a contact area of 4 mm diameter (Becker Meditec), sampled at 32
Hz. Electrodes were attached to the medial phalanges of the ring and little fingers of the
participants'  left  hand  using  self-adhesive  electrode  collars  and  electrolyte  gel.
Physiological  signals  were preprocessed  using  Matlab  software  (version  1.6.0_17).  The
following in-game events were logged: Actions (Fold, Call, Bet, and Raise) during all hand
positions (Pre-Flop, Flop, Turn and River; see  poker glossary), hand numbers (from 1 to
128), and leaderboard scores.
In a normal NLHE game, the majority of starting hands dealt to a player are considered
weak  in  strength,  thereby  being  often  folded  (e.g.,  Sklansky  &  Miller,  2006).  When
assessing decision making during playing NLHE in a controlled laboratory environment
with only 64 unique dealt poker hands, using an ecologically valid distribution of poker
hand  strength  is  not  feasible.  Therefore,  the  poker  hand  strength  distribution  (for  the
participant)  was  manipulated  to  include  hands  of  high  strength  (14/64  hands  that  are
generally considered strong), medium strength (26/64 hands that are generally considered
medium/uncertain in strength), and low strength (24/64 hands that are generally considered
weak), appearing in a pseudo-randomized order. 
6 The experiment included also a biofeedback condition (but biofeedback is not in the focus of the current 
thesis, and biofeedback-related results are not reported  here). During one of the two sets of 64 hands,  
participants heard sound beats that were synchronized with their own heartbeats, and during the other set, 
they heard the same sound beats at a non-synchronized steady pace (participants had headphones on  
during  the  entire  experiment).  The  order  of  the  set  during  which  biofeedback  was  received  was  
counterbalanced across participants.
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The  poker  game  abided  by  the  standard  rules  of  NLHE  for  five players,  with  the
following exceptions. Each dealt hand would start with the small and big blinds (forced
bets placed into the pot before play begins) set at 10 and 20, respectively, and with each
player at the table having 2000 chips (units of play money, totaling 100 big blinds) to play
with (for a picture, see Appendix in Study IV). Unlike in a normal NLHE game, the amount
of  chips  was reset  to 2000 after  each played hand.  This was done to  enable statistical
comparability  between corresponding  hands  across  participants.  The  hands  dealt  to  the
computer opponents were identical across participants (i.e., pseudo-randomized).
Initially unbeknownst to the participants, the computer opponents played by calling bets
and raises very often, and by only betting or raising with a very strong hand. Due to this, a
profitable strategy was to play mainly strong hands, and by betting and raising with them
(see Siler, 2010). After each hand played, the amount of chips won or lost was recorded and
displayed in  a  leaderboard,  visible  at  the  bottom right  corner  of  the  game-screen.  The
leaderboard displayed the current score of the participant and was updated after each hand.
The leaderboard also displayed scores of  four other fictitious players (not the computer
opponents). The scores of the fictitious players were also updated, predetermined, as the
game progressed.  Participants were told that  the scores displayed in the leaderboard were
attained by human players playing exactly the same game, prior to the current experiment,
but who were not  themselves participants in the experiment (this was a fictitious story).
Participants were  also  told  their  reward  for participation would  depend  on  their  final
ranking in the leaderboard, as follows: four movie tickets for first place,  three for second
place, two for third place and one for both fourth and fifth places.
3.3 Data-analyses
In Study I, six stories were interpreted as “mock” replies,  and thus excluded from further
analysis. Thus, 54 stories were analyzed. The average story length was 166.4 words, and
ranged from 60 to 850 words. Thematic and narrative analyses were employed. The stories
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were first coded in order to identify recurring themes by employing thematic analysis (Bran
& Clarke,  2006). Thereafter,  narrative analysis  (Biggerstaff,  2012, pp. 190–191; Willig,
2008, pp. 133–134) was employed to construct organized interpretations of sequences of
events, involving the previously observed themes, in the stories. Atlas.ti (version 6.1.1.)
was used in all analyses. 
In thematic analysis,  a  theme correspond to  an  observable patterned response  – that is
relevant to the research question –  within the data. Entries in the stories associated with
descriptions of emotions and losing were assessed. Narrative analysis involves observing
and interpreting ways in which people bring order to their experiences. By narrating, people
replicate  “dormant  stories”  in  the  implicit  social  representations  of  the  general  culture
(Lazslo, 2008; Moscovici, 2001; Parker, 2005). In other words, narrative analysis assesses
how  people  make  connections  between  various  events,  and  how  they  interpret  those
connections – i.e., how they construct narratives.  In Study I, authors J.P. and M.L. coded
the data, initially independently and thereafter in collaboration. Only the themes identified
and  mutually  agreed  upon by both  J.P.  and M.L.  were  further  subjected  to  substantial
reviewing. Reviewing of the themes was done in collaboration by all three authors. Finally,
the most consequential themes were defined and named: “Dissociative feelings”,  “Moral
indignation  and  chasing”,  “The  aftermath  of  tilting”,  “Experienced  vs.  inexperienced
players”, and “Benefits of poker experience”. The data showed sufficient re-occurrence of
the five central themes. Therefore, it was assumed that the data had reached the point of
saturation.  Thereafter  the authors organized the interpretations concerning consequential
sequences of events (narratives) in collaboration. Finally, a model (“meta-narrative”) was
created where both the observed themes and narratives are depicted as causal sequences of
events.  Data  excerpts  were  translated  from  Finnish,  and  confirmed  by  a  professional
linguist.
In  Study  II,  linear regression  analysis  was  employed  to evaluate  the  associations
between  PES,  Self-Rumination  and  Self-Reflection.  Logistic  regression  analysis  was
employed to evaluate the associations between PES (predictor) and the dichotomous poker
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decision making tasks (dependent variables).  Both poker decision making tasks were also
combined into a single dichotomous measure (2 = Correct answer in both tasks / 1 = One or
less correct answers).  Multiple binary logistic regression and simple slopes analyses were
employed  to  further  assess  the  associations  between  the  single  dichotomous  measure
(dependent  variable) and PES,  Self-Rumination,  Self-Reflection,  and  their  interactions
(predictors). All scales were centered.
In Study III,  a  two-step  multiple  regression  analysis  was employed  (Aiken & West,
1991). As the first step, PES and PEET, and their interaction, were entered in the analysis
as predictors, and ST as the dependent variable. As the second step, SL was entered in the
analysis as a predictor.  Associations between PEET and SL, and PES and SL were also
evaluated. Furthermore, a moderated partial mediation model – with SL as the mediator and
PES  as  the  moderator  –  was  composed.  Sobel's  test  and  simple  slopes  analysis were
employed to evaluate the moderated partial mediation effects. All scales were centered. In
Studies II and III, no data were identified that were out of the permissible range, logically
inconsistent or that had extreme values. Therefore, no participants were excluded from the
analyses.  Some kurtosis and skewness were observed in the distributions of the variables
and the model residuals. However, linear regression models with large sample sizes (>300)
are fairly robust against deviations from normality (Cohen et al., 2003).
In Study IV, mean EDA values were derived for one 3-s epoch before event (action
taken) onset, and for one 3-s epoch after event onset. EDA data were log-transformed to
normalize the distribution. The data were analyzed by employing the linear mixed models
procedure  (LMM) in  SPSS,  with  maximum  likelihood  estimation,  and  a  first-order
autoregressive covariance structure for the residuals. Hand number (running from 1 to 128)
was  specified  as  the  subject  variable,  and  an  aggregate  variable  “hand  sequence”  that
indexed each action within a single hand, was selected as the repeated variable. Correlation
was assumed between the residuals within a given hand, and the correlation was modeled
with the first-order autoregressive covariance. “Action” and “hand strength” were selected
as  factors  and  a  fixed-effects  model  that  included  these  factors  as  main  effects  was
specified. Player ID was also specified as a random effect with the variance components
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covariance matrix, allowing between subject variance in the intercepts. Two linear contrasts
were assessed: 1) a linear trend across actions (Fold, Call, Bet/Raise) and 2) a linear trend
across actions taken with hands of different strengths (weak hands, medium-strength hands,
strong hands). For simplicity, betting and raising were regarded as a single action and were
not analyzed separately. In exploratory analyses, event-related changes in EDA were also
tested using the following three contrasts: 1) Bet/Raise during River vs. Bet/Raise during
Pre-Flop, Flop, and Turn, 2) Call during River vs. Call during Pre-Flop, Flop, and Turn, and
3) Fold during River vs. Fold during Pre-Flop, Flop, and Turn. 
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4 RESULTS
4.1 Loss-induced emotions and tilting (Study I)
4.1.1 Dissociative feelings, moral indignation and chasing
A distinct pattern of emotion-related narratives characterizing tilting was observed. Firstly,
a theme was observed in which a significant monetary loss, usually following a bad beat,
elicited feelings of dissociation7 – namely, emptiness, numbness and disbelief. For example
(emphasis added):
“The turn card was inconsequential, and my pulse was probably nearly at 200 – it was the biggest post of
my life, and I just kept thinking “don't suck out on me on the river”, and, well, they sure did. I was struck by
disappointment and some sort of silence fell upon me: 'No fucking way,'” (M22, experience: 3–4 years, 200
000 played hands)
“It was a completely powerless, 'anesthetized' feeling, as if my entire body had been paralyzed.” (M41,
experience: 3–4 years, 500 000 played hands)
Secondly, a theme was observed in which losing felt unfair. This theme was sometimes
observed in association with dissociative feelings, and often in association with narrations
of  chasing behavior.  Chasing reflected an attempt to restore a  fair balance of wins and
losses, in light of the player's expectations (of “what is fair”). For example:
7 The term ”dissociation”  can be used  to  refer  to  both mild and severe  (and  somewhere in  between)  
disruptions in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, identity or perceptions of the environment
(e.g., Dell & O'neil, 2009). Accordingly, the severity of the experienced dissociation can be assessed in a 
continuum. In the current context, the term ”dissociation” refers to mild psychological disruptions.
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“In the end I ended up completely tilted as every single chip thrown on the virtual table ended up in my
opponents’ stacks, regardless of my own actions. [ . . . ] I felt that if I had the worse hand, it was unfair that
my opponent happened to have a better one. If I had the better hand and still lost, it was unfair to lose with
the better hand. I convinced myself that regardless of the situation, my losses were a Great Injustice, which
would surely eventually be rectified by Fate.” (M27, experience: 3–4 years, 500 000 played hands) 
“I played a longer session than normally,  because I wanted to win back what I had lost.  I made this
decision because, while playing, I felt that variance had 'mistreated me'”. (M24, experience: 3–4 years, 200
000 played hands)
4.1.2 The aftermath of tilting
After tilting had subsided, reports of  depression, anxiety, sadness  and  sleeping problems
were observed throughout the data.  In addition,  reported feelings of  disappointment (in
self) or remorse were observed. For example:
“Finally, after I had lost enough, I realized I needed to quit, and after having closed the tables I was
overcome by despair and depression. [ . . . ] I felt great sadness, because in just one day I had flushed down
the toilet my winnings from the past 2 months.” (M23, experience: 3–4 years, 250 000 played hands)
“I could not fall asleep normally for a couple of nights, because I kept thinking why I once again had to
throw  away  the  winnings  I  had  accumulated  during  the  last  month,  in  one  short  tilt-session.”  (M40,
experience: over 4 years, 500 000 played hands)
“After a few hours and a few cigarettes I calmed down. But after that, I felt very disappointed in myself,
and also  disappointed in my complete failure to control my tilt.” (M22, experience:  2–3 years,  400 000
played hands)
Furthermore,  there  was  indication  that  the  observed  feelings  of  self-focused
disappointment and remorse were associated with participants' general view of poker as a
game of skill, and of themselves as skilled players:
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“There have been excessive general feelings of 'being pissed off' and my mind has been too agitated to
relax. In particular; when these emotions occur during a session,  I feel afterwards that I have failed as a
poker professional. [ . . . ], In poker communities many professional players feel the same. It is considered
kind of shameful if you let your losses affect your life.” (M32, experience: over 4 years, 1 million played
hands)
4.1.3 Experienced vs. inexperienced players
The most prominent difference between experienced and inexperienced players in the data
was associated with narrations related to variance and bad luck. This observed theme can
be decomposed into two components:  (1) Inexperienced players often reported that bad
luck (e.g., bad beats) was a direct cause of negative emotions, most commonly anger, and
(2)  Experienced  players  often  reported  that  self-made  mistakes  were  a  direct  cause  of
negative emotions, whereas bad luck was interpreted as “merely variance”, and regarded
impassively. Experienced and inexperienced players were defined as those who received an
“experience score” of at least 1 standard deviation above (+1 SD), and below (–1 SD) the
sample mean, respectively. 
Inexperienced players (  –  1 SD):  
“But if you don’t try to bluff – when you hold a good hand – and go all-in and lose, it feels even worse
than when you bluff. Because in that moment, you have bet it all. Bad beat is such a painful thing.” (M32,
experience: 4 years, 60 000 played hands) 
“What really pisses me off is losing money to a completely bad player. I mean, losing to a player who has
no idea how badly he’s  playing.  [  .  .  .  ].  For sure,  these  complete fish hit  cards so much better  than
mathematical odds should allow.” (M34, experience: less than one year, 150 000 played hands) 
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Experienced players (  +  1 SD):  
“I am aware that in the end variance will balance itself to the level ‘that I deserve’, and thus even the
bigger pots that I lose mean nothing  if I have played them correctly.” (M20, experience: over 4 years, 5
million played hands) 
“Normally losing doesn’t feel bad at all  if you realize that you have played it more or less ‘correctly’.
Variance will make sure that by playing correctly, you will lose some, but also win some. But if you happen to
lose because you did something stupid, by playing half- heartedly, tired or otherwise badly, then the losses
irritate me more than usual.” (M35, experience: over 4 years, 500 000 played hands) 
4.1.4 Benefits of poker experience
Some experienced players (+1 SD) narrated in their stories that acquiring poker experience
in itself had increased their emotional tolerance of losses.  In addition,  some experienced
players narrated that their stories of losing did not relate to the immediate past, but rather
reflected memories from years ago. For example: 
“Even though you feel nasty, you mustn’t let the fear get a hold of you. Standard and common losses are
therefore easily tolerable,  they are ‘business as usual’ [ .  .  .  ]  The more I have played, the greater my
tolerance has grown.” (M30, experience: 4 years, 900 000 played hands) 
“I have to say that it has been a couple of years since even the bigger losses have significantly affected my
emotional life, so my memories are not that fresh.” (M27, experience: 3–4 years, 500 000 played hands) 
“I have been more or less able to win by playing poker for almost five years, and I have learned the nature
of variance and other mechanisms of the game [ . . . ] When I was getting to know poker, losing and winning
did elicit great emotions and thrills.” (M24, experience: over 4 years, 500 000 played hands)
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Based on the results,  two  diagram representations related to tilting were constructed:
Figure 1 illustrates on a general level the phenomenology and aetiology of tilting. Figure 2
depicts differences in reacting to significant monetary poker losses between poker players
of varying experience.
Figure 1. A diagram representation of the narrative structure (meta-narrative) related to the phenomenology
and aetiology of tilting on a general level. Tilting is first instigated by a significant (monetary) loss, followed
by  dissociative  feelings  and/or  moral  indignation.  Chasing  then  occurs,  reflecting  a  desire  to  restore  a
previously  lost  “moral  order”,  or  “fair  balance”  of  wins  and  losses.  Finally,  in  the  aftermath  of  tilting,
self-focused feelings of disappointment, anxiety and depression are experienced. After tilting has subsided,
rumination over lost resources occurs, expressed as sleeping problems, sadness and depressive/anxious mood
states. The arrows indicate the direction of  time.  Reproduced from International Gambling Studies,  13(2),
255–270. (Study I).
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Figure 2. A diagram representation of the narrative structure (meta-narrative) related to two possible causes
of  a  significant  loss,  bad  beats  and  bad  plays,  and  five  pathways  resulting  in  emotional  and  impassive
reactions to the loss. Pathways B and C are characterized by feelings of injustice and unfairness (i.e., moral
indignation), and they are also associated with tilting. Pathways A and D are characterized by  a reportedly
impassive  (or  emotionless)  reaction  in  response  to  a  significant  loss.  Pathway  E  is  characterized  by
self-focused feelings of disappointment, anger and frustration for not playing as well as one believes s/he
should have played. Putatively, pathways A, D and E are more likely followed/taken by experienced players,
and  pathways  B  and  C  are  more  likely  followed/taken  by  inexperienced  players.  Reproduced  from
International Gambling Studies, 13(2), 255–270. (Study I).
4.2 Determinants of poker decision making (Study II)
Participants with more poker playing experience (higher PES scores) reported lower levels
of self-rumination (B = –0.07, t(353) = –2.52, p = .01; adjusted for age and education B =
–0.07, SE = 0.2,  t(351) = –2.36, p < .05). There was no direct  association between poker
playing experience  and self-reflection.  Thus,  Hypothesis  1  was partly  supported.  Poker
playing experience was also associated with a lower likelihood of believing in one's ability
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to influence luck (standardized OR = 0.88,  SE = 0.05,  p < .05),  supporting Hypothesis 2.
Participants with more poker playing experience  were more likely to answer correctly in
both  decision  making tasks/scenarios (task/scenario  1:  OR = 1.2,  SE = 0.07,  p <  .01;
task/scenario 2: OR = 1.13, SE = 0.06, p < .05), supporting Hypothesis 3.
When both dependent variables (task/scenario 1 and task/scenario 2) were combined into
a single dichotomous measure (2 = Correct answer in both tasks / 1 = One or less correct
answers),  interaction- and simple slopes analyses indicated that  for experienced players
(PES scores  +1 SD),  the  tendency to self-reflection was associated with better  decision
making. For inexperienced players (PES scores  –2 SD),  the tendency to  self-rumination
was associated with better  decision making.  Poker playing experience predicted correct
answers in the poker decision tasks in all analyses,  further supporting Hypothesis 3.  The
interaction effects, and the results of simple slopes analysis, are presented in Table 3, and
Figures 3 and 4.
Table 3. Multiple binary logistic regression presenting the main effects, interaction effects and simple slopes
analysis of self-rumination, self-reflection and poker experience scales when using the combined dichotomous
measure as a dependent variable
Standard logistic regression statistics Simple slopes with PES as the moderator
Model B SE Wald p OR Slope B SE Wald p OR
Self-rumination Simple  slopes  for  self-rumination  atdifferent levels of PES scores
PES 0.12 0.05 5.25 <.05 1.13 −2 SD 0.41 0.21 3.89 <.05 1.51
Self-rumination 0.02 0.10 0.03 n.s 1.02 −1 SD 0.21 0.13 2.69 .10 1.24
PES × self-rumination −0.09 0.04 4.00 <.05 0.91 +1 SD −0.17 0.15 1.39 n.s. 0.83
+2 SD −0.37 0.23 2.58 .10 0.68
Self-reflection Simple slopes for self-reflection at differentlevels of PES scores
PES 0.11 0.05 4.29 <.05 1.12 −2 SD −0.38 0.29 1.72 n.s. 0.67
Self-reflection 0.15 0.13 1.28 n.s 1.16 −1 SD −0.11 0.18 0.42 n.s. 0.88
PES × self-reflection 0.12 0.12 3.74 .05 1.13 +1 SD 0.42 0.20 4.31 <.05 1.52
+2 SD 0.69 0.32 4.61 <.05 1.9
Note. Grey background color denotes a statistically significant effect. PES = Poker Experience Scale.
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Figure 3. Association between Self-Reflection scores and likelihood of correct answer to both poker decision
tasks/scenarios in  participants with high versus low poker experience (PES scores). Simple slopes are one
standard deviation above and below the mean. Only the slope for experienced players (+1 SD) is statistically
significant. Reproduced from Journal of Gambling Studies, 29(3), 491–505 (Study II).
Figure  4.  Association  between  Self-Rumination  scores  and  likelihood  of  correct  answer  to  both  poker
decision tasks/scenarios in participants with high versus low poker experience (PES scores). Simple slopes are
two standard deviations above and below the mean. Only the slope for inexperienced players (−2 SD) is
statistically significant. Reproduced from Journal of Gambling Studies, 29(3), 491–505 (Study II).
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4.3 Sensitivity to losses and tilting severity (Study III)
The  first  step  in  the  (two-step)  multiple  regression  analysis  resulted  in  a  statistically
significant model (F(3, 412) = 31.98, p < .001, R² = 0.18). Poker playing experience (PES)
was positively associated with a self-perceived impression of having tilted less severely as
a result  of  accumulating experience in  poker  (PEET;  B = 0.148,  p  < .001),  supporting
Hypothesis 1. Poker experience was positively associated with tilting severity (B = 0.22, p
< .001), contrary to Hypothesis 2. However, PEET was negatively associated with tilting
severity (B = –0.25, p < .001), and the interaction term (PES x PEET) was also significant
(B =  –0.118,  p  < .001).  A simple slopes analysis  of  this  interaction suggested that  the
observed effect was driven by participants who scored high on PES (+1 SD: B = –0.482, p
< .001). This result indicates that higher PEET scores buffer experienced poker players
against severe tilting. Figure 5 illustrates the first step model.
Figure 5. First step model. Associations between PES (Poker Experience Scale), PEET (Perceived Effect of
Experience on Tilting) and ST (Severity of Tilting; Dependent Variable), and the Interaction effect (PES ×
PEET) presented graphically. Unstandardized B-values are shown (***p <.001). The model is statistically
significant (F(3, 412) = 31.98, p < .001, R2 = .18). All predictors are centered. Reproduced from Journal of
Gambling Studies. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1007/s10899-012-9339-4 (Study III).
52
The second step in the multiple regression analysis resulted in a better fitting model (ΔR²
= 0.09, F(4, 411) = 39.89, p < .001). A statistically significant moderated partial mediation
effect was also found (all Sobel's Zs > 2.00, all ps < .05)8. The moderated mediation effect
at different levels of PES -scores is presented in Figure 6a and b.
Figure 6. Second step model (moderated mediation model presented at two different levels of PES [a −1 SD
and b +1 SD]). Associations between PES (Poker Experience Scale), PEET (Perceived Effect of Experience
on Tilting), SL (Sensitivity to Losses) and ST (Severity of Tilting; Dependent Variable), and the Interaction
effects (PES × PEET) presented graphically. Unstandardized B-values are shown (***p < .001. **p < .01. †p
< .1). The model is statistically significant (F(4, 411) = 39.89, p < .001, R 2 = .28). All predictors are centered.
Reproduced from Journal of Gambling Studies. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1007/s10899-012-9339-4
(Study III).
Sensitivity to losses was the strongest individual predictor of tilting severity at all levels
of  PES-scores  (B =  0.598,  p <  .001),  supporting  Hypothesis  4.  Poker  experience  was
marginally  negatively  associated  with sensitivity  to  losses  (B =  –0.036,  p  = .08). This
association  was  stronger  when  sensitivity  to  losses  was  regressed  on poker  experience
outside the context of the second step model (B = –0.048, p < .05), suggesting support for
Hypothesis  3.  Additionally,  especially  those experienced players (+1 SD) who held the
impression of having benefited from their experience (as measured by PEET), successfully
down-regulated their sensitivity to losses (providing additional support for Hypothesis 3).
Full statistics for both models are presented in Table 4.
8 This effect was observed also by employing a bootstrapping technique based on the “model 2” method 
presented in Preacher et al. (2007).
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Table 4.  Two step multiple regression analysis presenting the main effects, interaction effects and simple
slopes analysis of the Perceived Effect of Experience on Tilting (PEET), Poker Experience Scale (PES), and
Sensitivity to Losses on the Severity of Tilting
Model
Model statistics Simple slopes  with PES as themoderator
B t p R 2 F p Slope B t p 
1st step 0.18 31.98 <.001
PES 0.22 5.75 <.001 −1 SD −0.02 −0.46 n.s.
PEET −0.25 −5.44 <.001
PES × PEET −0.11 −5.61 <.001 +1 SD −0.48 −7.69 <.001
2nd step 0.28 39.89 <.001
PES 0.24 6.67 <.001 −1 SD 0.02 0.45 n.s.
PEET −0.14 −3.16 <.01
PES × PEET −0.09 −4.50 <.001
Sensitivity to Losses 0.59 7.19 <.001 +1 SD −0.32 −4.50 <.001
4.4 Electrodermal activity and poker decision making
Pre-decision EDA increased in the order of folding < calling < betting and raising. Due to
this,  a significant linear trend  was observed  across actions,  supporting Hypothesis  1.  A
significant  linear  trend  revealed  that  also  post-decision  EDA increased  in  the  order  of
folding < calling < betting and raising. Pre-decision and post-decision EDA did not increase
in the order of actions taken with a weak hand < actions taken with a medium-strength hand
(or strength is uncertain) < actions taken with a strong hand. Due to this, the linear trend
across hand strength categories was nonsignificant, and Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
However, based on visual inspection of the EDA data, an a posteriori quadratic contrast was
performed (i.e., actions taken with weak hands and actions taken with strong hands versus
actions taken with medium-strength hands). This contrast was statistically significant – that
is,  actions  taken  with  weak hands  and  actions  taken with  strong hands  elicited  higher
pre-decision and post-decision EDA as compared with actions taken with medium-strength
hands.  Exploratory analyses  also showed that the Bet/Raise action taken during the River
hand position elicited higher EDA as compared with the Bet/Raise action taken during the
other hand positions. Table  5 summarizes the contrast analyses.  Figures  7–9 depict EDA
responses related to Hypotheses 1 and 2, and the exploratory analyses, respectively.
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Table 5. Summary of contrast analyses
Variable Source           Contrast Estimate              SE                   df                    t
                  (ln|µS/m|)
Pre-decision EDA
Linear trend across actions 0.00763                   0.00121          5438.04          6.26*** 
(Hypothesis 1)
Linear trend across hand strengths 0.00438                   0.00697          3122.64          0.63
(Hypothesis 2)
Strong and weak hands vs. 0.03299                   0.00804          3054.55          4.1***
medium-strength hands
Bet/raise during the river vs. 0.02812                   0.01221          1122.33         2.3*
bet/raise during other hand positions
Call during the river vs. 0.01246                   0.00960          2409.31         1.3         
call during other hand positions
Fold during the river vs.             –0.06813                   0.03859          1442.09        –1.77
fold during other hand positions           (p = 0.078)
Post-decision EDA
Linear trend across actions 0.00931                   0.00118          5410.35          7.86***
Linear trend across hand strengths 0.00664                   0.00697          3116.74          0.95
(Hypothesis 2)
Strong and weak hands vs.       0.03347          0.00805          3052.98           4.2***
medium-strength hands
Note. Pre-decision electrodermal activity (EDA) = mean EDA during the three seconds preceding event onset.
Post-decision EDA = mean EDA during the three seconds following event onset. Actions are fold, call, and
bet/raise. Hand strength categories are weak, medium, and strong. Hand positions are pre-flop, the flop, the
turn and the river. *p < .05. ***p < .001. 
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Figure 7 (left; Hypothesis 1). Centered mean EDA (ln|µS/m|) elicited by three different NLHE poker game actions: Bet/Raise, Call and Fold. The x-axis
depicts seconds (–8s – 7s) preceding and following an action. Second 1 is the first second after action onset.
Figure 8 (middle; Hypothesis 2). Centered mean EDA (ln|µS/m|)  elicited by NLHE poker game actions taken with hands that belong to one of three
categories: Strong hands, hands with medium strength, and weak hands. The x-axis depicts seconds (–8s – 7s) preceding and following an action. Second 1
is the first second after action onset.
Figure 9 (right; Exploratory analyses). Centered mean EDA (ln|µS/m|) elicited by three different NLHE poker game actions (Bet/Raise, Call and Fold)
during four different hand positions. The x-axis depicts hand position (Pre-Flop, Flop, Turn and River). 
Figures 7 – 9 are reproduced from Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 6(1), 55–70. (Study IV).
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Verbal reports to open ended verbal questions and the Likert-questionnaire indicated that
most participants did not notice the game consisted of two identical sets of 64 hands. Five
participants reported having “suspected” that some of the hands dealt  in the second set
might have been similar to ones dealt in the first set. Performing the analyses by omitting
these  five  participants  did  not  change  the  results.  Verbal  reports  and  the
Likert-questionnaire  also  indicated  that  participants did  not  feel  the  game resembled  a
“normal”  poker  game.  Many  participants reported  that  they  were  unsure  as  to  what
specifically made them feel the game was “rigged”, and that they felt they were being dealt
too  many strong NLHE starting  hands.  Furthermore,  most  participants reported  having
noticed that the computer opponents did not often fold, and that they therefore felt the best
strategy was to bet/raise with strong hands and not to attempt bluffing (betting/raising with
weak hands in an attempt to make the opponent fold).
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5 DISCUSSION
The present thesis evaluated the association between emotions and decision making in the
game of poker, with emphasis on the tilting phenomenon. Prior to conducting Study I, there
existed little scientific knowledge concerning tilting (see also Browne, 1989; Griffiths et al.,
2010;  Rosecrance,  1986;  Rosenthal,  1995). Thus,  an empirical framework needed to be
established against which tilting could be evaluated – Study I was designed to this end.
Both Studies II and III were inspired by the results of Study I,  and as such  they  can be
interpreted as its extensions – i.e., Studies II and III were carried out within the framework
of  Study  I.  Study  IV  aimed  at  further  exploring the  basis  of  emotion-related
psychophysiological  reactivity and decision  making in  poker,  from neuroscientific  and
economic perspectives.  More specifically,  in Studies I–IV, four topics were investigated:  
1) The phenomenology and aetiology of losing, and by extension, tilting in poker, 2) The
associations  between  poker  experience,  poker  decision  making,  self-rumination  and
self-reflection,  3)  The  associations  between  poker  experience  and  specific  emotional
characteristics that either protect players from tilting, or predispose them to it, and 4) The
psychophysiological reactivity, as measured by EDA, elicited during NLHE poker decision
making. 
5.1 The phenomenology and aetiology of tilting
The results of Study I suggested that the most consequential emotion-related elements of
tilting behavior were  dissociative feelings, moral indignation, chasing  behavior,  and the
aftermath of tilting, during which participants seemingly displayed ruminative behavior. In
particular, rumination was  primarily  manifested as  disappointment in self,  and feelings of
depression and anxiety9 over lost resources.
9 It needs to be noted that  the terms ”depression” and ”anxiety” refer to emotion vocabulary observed in 
participants' narrations. In other words, they refer to the words used by participants to describe their  
feelings. Hence, ”depression” and ”anxiety” are not used here in the context of clinical pathologies.
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The observed theme of dissociative feelings following a significant loss is in line with a
previous report by Rosenthal (1995), in which experiencing bad beats was associated with
feelings of disbelief and dissociation among gamblers. Such feelings are typically reported
in association with various psychological traumas, such as bereavement and post-traumatic
stress disorder  (Foa & Hearst-Ikeda, 1996).  Therefore, it is conceivable  that the reported
feelings of disbelief and  emptiness protect  players from immediately experiencing strong
negative emotions that would otherwise be elicited by a sober affirmation of the outcome.
Poker losses may appear less severe than the aforementioned psychological traumas during
which dissociation typically occurs. However, given that many players reported having lost
both  significant  amounts  of  money  and time,  the  reported  feelings  of  disbelief  and
emptiness  seem reasonable and suggest that poker losses also can be traumatizing.  It is
possible that dissociative feelings are beneficial in the short run, but become detrimental in
the long run, if they occur frequently and result in an inability to process the traumatizing
losses.
The theme of  moral  indignation  was often  observed in  association with  dissociative
feelings, and it can  also be interpreted as the core  instigator of tilting.  In order to better
characterize the  phenomenological  basis of  moral  indignation  in  poker,  suppose  a
hypothetical poker scenario where a player bets all-in pre-flop (see poker glossary) with the
strongest  starting  hand  in  (Texas  Hold'em)  poker,  pocket  aces,  and  gets  called  by  one
opponent. Typically, in this situation, the likelihood of pocket aces winning is around 80 %.
Hence, by betting all-in and getting called, the player is rationally expected to win 80 % of
whatever  money  is  in  the  pot  –  in  the  long  run.  However,  arguably,  what  players
subjectively feel they normatively rather than statistically ought to win (or what they feel
they are entitled to) is not 80 % of the money in the pot. Instead, players merely feel that
they ought to win, period, on the basis of their statistically rational expectations. In most
cases, however, the entire pot is either won or lost. After losing the pot, players conceivably
feel that what ought to have happened, did not happen – they feel they did not get what they
were entitled to.  Correspondingly, after winning the pot,  players feel that  what ought to
have  happened,  did  happen  –  they  feel they  got  what  they  were  entitled  to.
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Notwithstanding,  mathematically,  neither  outcome  corresponds  to  what  is  expected  to
happen.  This  contention resonates  also  with  Rosenthal's  (1995;  see  also Tendler,  2011)
interpretation  of  bad  beats  as  being  in  discrepancy with  gamblers'  perceptions  of  “fair
chance”: People seem to have a tendency to believe that, in a general ethical sense, “things
ought to be fair”. 
 Furthermore,  participants' narrations  of  chasing behavior  were  characterized  by
descriptions  of  attempts  to  regain that  which  rightfully  belonged to  them. Hence,  it  is
important to note that chasing should not be defined merely as behavior whereby players
aim at regaining a positive emotional state by winning back quickly the money that was
previously  lost.  Instead,  chasing  (in  the  stories  of  Study I) reflected behavior  whereby
players  attempted to  rectify  what  they  felt  was a  morally  unjustified course of  events.
Putatively,  a successful chase  would have restored in participants' minds  the moral order
broken  by,  e.g.,  a  bad  beat.  The  aforementioned  observations  resonate  also  with  the
working  ethic  connected  to the  socio-historical  context  of  the  post-protestant  Finnish
society, according to which work should always be duly compensated, and when this does
not happen, moral indignation ensues (Jokinen & Saaristo, 2010).
Another consequential observation was made in Study I concerning differences in  the
experiential ambiance  of losing and tilting between experienced and inexperienced poker
players.  There  was  clear  indication  that  uncontrollable  game  elements,  such  as
self-perceived  bad  luck,  elicited  negative  emotions  –  including  moral  indignation  –
especially in inexperienced players.  By contrast, experienced players seemed to  think of
bad  luck  as  “merely  variance”  that should  be  regarded  impassively.  Evidently,  for
experienced players, an understanding of variance results in a mature disposition towards
losing: Bad luck does not matter, as variance eventually “balances your luck”. If a player
does not understand the mathematics of variance (as might be the case with inexperienced
poker players) bad beats and other incidences of self-perceived bad luck might be attributed
to, e.g., unfairness and injustice, thereby eliciting negative emotions10. 
10 However,  self-made mistakes  were a cause of negative emotions especially  for experienced players. In  
other words, self-perceived bad  plays  – but not bad  beats  – elicited negative emotions in experienced  
players.
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 It needs to be noted that being an experienced player, and more skilled than an average
player, is not necessarily sufficient to be a winning player, as most players belong to the
losing majority. Therefore it is reasonable to presume that many experienced and skilled
players  undergo negative  emotions  induced  by  losses,  and tilt.  Furthermore,  previous
anecdotal evidence (and also evidence presented in the current thesis) suggests that even
many  winning  players  sometimes  tilt  (e.g.,  Hilger  &  Taylor,  2007;  Tendler,  2011).
Notwithstanding, it is also reasonable to propose that technical skills, including knowledge
of  poker  concepts,  form a dynamic contingency with players'  emotional  (mental  game)
skills.  Inflated  beliefs  about  skill  are  common  among  tilting  gamblers  whose  chasing
behavior  is  motivated  by  an  illusion  of  control,  even  when  constant  losing  proves  the
contrary.  Arguably,  this  illusion  of  control  is  mitigated  by  way  of  appreciating  the
inalienable role of variance in poker.  The route for acquiring poker experience and skill
goes through an adequate epistemic understanding of the relationship  between skill and
chance in the game (Dickerson & O'Connor, 2006; see also Bjerg, 2010). 
5.2 Emotion regulation and poker playing experience
In poker, a consequential difference between experienced and inexperienced players seems
to be the ability to differentiate the circumstances one can control from those one cannot,
and this ability  may grow only  by experience.  Previous anecdotal evidence  also  suggests
that  the  success  of  many players  might  in  part  depend on their  ability  to  successfully
regulate  negative  emotions  induced  by  (often  uncontrollable) elements  of  the  game
(Angelo, 2007;  Hilger & Taylor, 2007;  Tendler, 2011).  Being able to “let go” of  (to not
ruminate  on) unfavorable  outcomes  of  previous  actions  is  a  consequential  poker  skill
element. In other words, emotional aspects of poker playing skills (mental game skills) play
a significant role in poker skill development. Due to the overt influence emotions have on
decision making, it is material for players to develop their mental game skills if they aspire
to  be successful poker players.  It  is well established that mental game skills,  or mental
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tolerance  under  pressure, are  important factors also in  many  competitive  sports  (e.g.,
Rotella, 1996). Essentially, the same holds true also for the game of poker. For example, a
player who has proficient technical skills, but insufficient emotional skills in poker, might
be in danger of losing all his/her money as a result of a single tilt-session.
The aforementioned negative emotions experienced in the aftermath of tilting  suggest
that  rumination  is implicated  in  poker  experience  and  poker  skill  development.
Furthermore, the results of Study I suggested that for experienced players, monetary losses
resulting from uncontrollable game elements (such as bad beats) were not a particularly
prominent source of negative emotions – instead, experienced players often  expressed a
benign indifference (a  reflective  “que sera, sera -mentality”) towards losing due to bad
luck. As such, the results  of Study I  are  in line with the results  of Study II, where  trait
self-rumination and self-reflection were implicated in poker experience and poker decision
making.  Thus, the hypotheses formed based on qualitative  observations  made in Study I,
were  supported by  quantitative  data  in  Study II. Firstly,  experienced poker  players,  as
compared with inexperienced ones, were less predisposed to self-rumination, and also less
likely  to  believe  in  their  ability  to  influence  luck. Secondly,  experienced  players  were
mathematically more accurate in poker decision making.  Finally, self-reflection (but not
self-rumination) was implicated in the decision making accuracy of experienced players,
whereas  self-rumination (but  not  self-reflection)  was implicated in  the decision making
accuracy of inexperienced players. It therefore seems that as players accumulate experience
and develop their poker skills, they should at some point learn to stop self-ruminating and
start self-reflecting.
A possible way to interpret these results  is as follows. Some poker players might have
played for many years  and have been dealt a substantial amount of poker hands  without
succeeding  to “move up the stakes”11.  It  is  conceivable that  self-reflection is  beneficial
especially  at the higher stakes, where the  range of losses and wins  – and the emotional
turmoils  they entail –  can be immense.  If this were the case, it would not be enough to
merely play for many years and be dealt many poker hands in order to acquire a high level
11 In fact, the author of this thesis is one of these players!
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of poker skill. At the higher stakes, the level of competition places increasing demands on
players for both proficient emotion regulation and technical skill development. Putatively,
the inability to self-reflect hinders the progress whereby players acquire the technical and
mental skills necessary for advancing to play at higher stakes. In other words, the time to
stop self-ruminating and start self-reflecting might be when players aspire to “step up their
game and raise the stakes” (see the Appendix for further discussion on this possibility).
Based  on  the  results  of  Studies  I  and  II,  it  was  further  hypothesized that  while
experienced players occasionally tilt, they probably do so less frequently and less intensely
than experienced players, because they appreciate the limits of their skills and the inherent
role  of  chance  in  the  game.  It  was  also hypothesized  that  the  occurrence  of  negative
emotions,  such as  anger,  frustration,  and feelings  of  unfairness  induced by losses  (i.e.,
emotional sensitivity to losses), would be a compelling predictor of the frequency, intensity
and  perceived  harm  (i.e.,  severity)  of  tilting,  and that experienced  players  would  be
emotionally less sensitive to losses, as compared with inexperienced ones.
As expected,  the results of Study III suggested that  emotional sensitivity to losses was
prominently associated with higher severity of tilting. Furthermore, the results indicated
that  experienced  players  were  emotionally  less  sensitive  to  losses,  as  compared  with
inexperienced ones. These findings are congruent with the conclusions presented in Studies
I and II, and thus provide further evidence in support of the role of emotion regulation in
poker experience and skill development, and poker decision making in general.
It was also found that, contrary to the hypothesis, experienced poker players reported
more severe tilting than inexperienced players. This result appears to be in tension with the
previous results of Studies I and II. However, a number of reasoned interpretations can be
made to explain the apparent contradiction. It is possible that experienced players are less
likely to tilt in relative terms, per single hand, but more likely to tilt in the long run. Thus,
the positive association between poker experience and tilting severity might relate to an
overall larger amount of tilt-inducing situations that experienced players are bound to
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encounter in playing, as compared with inexperienced players12. Another explanation is that
experienced players might have a different perception of what tilting means, as compared
with that of less experienced players. Although the same definition of tilting was provided
in the survey to all participants, experienced players  might, for example, believe they are
“losing control” – this description was part of the given definition – in the same situation in
which inexperienced players believe they have full control.
It should be noted that these  interpretations  are  compatible  with the finding  from the
same study, which indicated that experienced players – although reporting severe tilting –
also held the personal impression of having previously (before having accumulated a high
level  of  poker  experience)  tilted  even  more  severely.  Moreover,  additional  evidence
supporting  the  credibility  of  the  aforementioned conclusions comes  from a  recent
unpublished study, which successfully replicated in a sample of international poker players
the  results  of  Studies  II  and  III  concerning  the  association  between  poker  playing
experience, self-rumination and sensitivity to losses (Palomäki et al., unpublished data).
Together,  the findings from Studies I–III establish a preliminary framework suggesting
that  emotion  regulation  abilities  –  or  mental  game  skills  – are  an  important  factor  in
protecting players from tilting and thereby also  increasing their  financial success in the
game. Various emotional characteristics were identified that either protect players from, or
predispose  them to, negative  tilt-inducing  emotions  elicited by various  elements  of  the
game.  These  emotional  characteristics,  in  turn,  differ  between  experienced  and
inexperienced  poker  players.  In  particular,  acquiring  poker  experience  seems  to  be
associated with an “emotionally mature” disposition regarding monetary losses in poker,
and,  arguably,  decreased  (relative) likelihood of detrimental decision making as seen in
tilting behavior.
12 This,  in turn, might relate to i) higher overall amount of poker hands played, ii) higher average stakes  
played at, resulting in, on average, higher occasional monetary losses (despite the fact experienced players
in, in the  long run, more money than inexperienced players), and iii) higher overall amount of times  
betting  with  statistically  strong  hands  (experienced  players  probably  bet  more  frequently  than  
inexperienced players with strong hands and therefore encounter potential bad beats more often than the 
latter).
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5.3 Psychophysiology of poker decisions
In addition to assessing the basis of tilting behavior and its association with poker playing
experience  and  skill,  this  thesis  sought  to  begin  producing  new  knowledge  on  the
psychophysiological  basis  of  poker  decision making processes and emotional  reactivity.
Hence, Study IV aimed to assess how emotional reactivity elicited by various NLHE poker
actions  is reflected in EDA, which is a robust index of emotional arousal.  In particular,
based on both economic (EUT) and neuroscientific (SMH) theories of decision making and
emotions, it  was hypothesized that  different actions  taken with poker  hands of varying
strength are associated with different levels of anticipated utility, as measured and indexed
by EDA.
The results of Study IV indicated that, as expected, pre-decision EDA increased in the
order  of  folding  <  calling  <  betting/raising.  This  result  supports the  hypothesis  that
pre-decision EDA reflects the anticipated utility of a given decision in a NLHE poker game,
and allows also for situating the game of NLHE poker within the general context of both
neuroscientific  and  economic  models  of  human  decision  making  and  emotions.  For
example, the SMH postulates that mental images of choice options in a decision making
situation become “marked” by distinct somatic states through associative learning (Bechara
& Damasio, 2005;  Damasio, 1994/2006).  It is reasonable to propose that somatic states
associated with  the mental  images  of  betting/raising,  calling,  and folding – that  is,  the
somatic  states  that  “mark”  these  actions  –  are  activated  (as  indicated  by  EDA),  when
participants  are  deciding which  action  to  take. Due  to  participants  recognizing the
profitability  of not bluffing and betting/raising  only with strong hands  (this style of play
was profitable because the computer opponents rarely folded or bet/raised, and frequently
“just” called), the higher levels of EDA preceding betting/raising, as compared with folding
and calling,  arguably  reflect  a  learned association between betting/raising and a  higher
likelihood of profit. This, in turn, possibly indicates that higher levels of emotional arousal
precede/predict situations  where  betting/raising  is  likely  to  be the  action  chosen  –  i.e.,
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reflecting positively valenced enthusiasm in anticipation of profit.
It  should be noted  that  while  EDA is  a  useful  index of  emotional  arousal (i.e.,  the
intensity of affect;  e.g.,  Levita et al.,  2009), it  is non-specific with respect to emotional
valence (i.e., the positive vs. negative -dimension of affect). As such, it is possible that the
observed EDA responses preceding various actions also reflect negatively valenced arousal
– for instance, frustration in the case of folding and having to relinquish a previously made
large investment in the pot. However, in the  experiment, folding almost never resulted in
relinquishing  a  large  investment  (of  chips). On  average,  participants  played  by  not
betting/raising with hands that might have to  be eventually folded.  When participants did
fold, the size of the pot was almost always modest. Arguably, relinquishing only a modest
amount  of  previously  invested  chips is  not  a  prominent  cause  of  negative  or  positive
arousal. In other words, participants knew that by folding they would not lose or gain any
chips, whereas by betting/raising or calling at least some chips were attainable. 
The non-specificity of EDA regarding the valence of affect is reflected also in the fact
that the hypothesis on the relationship of EDA with hand strength was not supported. That
is, contrary to the hypothesis, actions taken with hands whose strength was medium (i.e.,
risky/uncertain) elicited the lowest levels of EDA. In the experiment, participants adopted a
playing style  where they favored  betting/raising with strong hands to merely calling with
them. Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that betting/raising with strong hands involved
little  risk  or  uncertainty,  because  betting/raising  with  said  hands  more  often  than  not
resulted  in  profit.  Similarly,  actions  taken with weak hands  also involved little  risk  or
uncertainty, as participants would almost always eventually fold. In other words, playing
with these hands was associated with very little  outcome variability.  Hence,  the higher
levels of EDA associated with actions taken with both weak and strong hands conceivably
relates  to  an  emotionally  arousing  state,  such  as  positively  valenced  enthusiasm  (in
anticipation of profit/reward with strong hands) or negatively valenced frustration and/or
anxiety  (from having to  allocate  time  to  play  a  hand with  no  prospects  of  profit,  and
eventually having to give up and fold).  By contrast, risk and uncertainty associated with
hands of medium strength might be related to an analytical, emotionally “detached”  and
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non-arousing  cognitive  strategy  in  decision  making  –  i.e.,  decision  making  that  elicits
neither positively (i.e., enthusiasm) nor negatively (i.e., frustration and/or anxiety) valenced
arousal. 
These assumptions, however, are contended by evidence  suggesting that uncertainty is
associated with an affectively “charged” state, thereby being related to strong degrees of
aversive arousal (e.g., Hirsh et al.,  2012).  Thus, the current results need to be interpreted
with caution. Notwithstanding, the concept of “risk and uncertainty” is not unambiguously
defined between, for example, poker and “real life” decision making. In the former (but not
the latter), risky or uncertain decisions always relate to a limited number of choice options
(i.e., five actions at maximum), which is cognitively manageable and thus not necessarily
associated with an affectively charged state.
5.4 Limitations and future directions
Producing new knowledge in  a field of science where pre-existing empirical evidence is
scarce often requires creating novel study designs. However, novel study designs also often
introduce a fair number of limitations that need to be considered, and directions for future
research in addressing these limitations should be given.
The sample demographics in  Studies I–IV were highly specific  – i.e.,  mostly young
Finnish males. Although these samples probably did accurately represent a Finnish poker
playing population, the results cannot be generalized across gender, or across nationality.
Due to this, the results obtained from Study I, in particular, need to be interpreted within the
socio-historical context of the  (post-protestant) Finnish society (see Jokinen & Saaristo,
2010). Arguably, when narrating about significant poker losses, poker players (implicitly)
replicated in their  stories the meta-narrative structures connected to the  Finnish  welfare
society ethos.  Therefore, for further tilting and chasing -related  qualitative research,  the
local societal conditions under which poker is typically played, should be given thorough
attention,  and  sociological  theories  of  social  identities  should  be  considered  (Jenkins,
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2008).
In  Study  I,  tilting  was  primarily  assumed  to  result  from  experiencing  a  significant
monetary loss in poker. However,  multiple phenomenologically dissimilar instigators of
tilting might exist. These include (but are not limited to) prolonged periods of minor losses,
or factors external to the game, such as exhaustion or “needling” by other players (Browne,
1989; see also Tendler, 2011). Further research is thus required to evaluate if tilting differs
phenomenologically when induced by dissimilar events.
Studies II and III face many limitations inherent in correlative  (questionnaire/survey)
studies.  The  most  noteworthy  limitation  is  the  inability  to  infer  directions  of  causality
between the analyzed measures. This limitation is especially relevant due to the results of
Study I,  which clearly alluded to a causal mechanism in  that acquiring poker experience
resulted  in improved emotion regulation abilities. That is to say, participants  in Study I
narrated that playing poker and thereby acquiring poker experience had been a significant
reason  for them to have  become more proficient in  regulating their emotions.  For them,
poker had been a “learning ground” for emotional maturity. Notwithstanding, the results of
Studies II and III cannot  support this assumption  of a specific direction of causality. The
emotional characteristics measured by questionnaires are often trait-like (i.e., stable across
time), and it is thus conceivable that people who possess these traits are predisposed to
continue  playing  poker,  thereby accumulating  poker  experience.  A  possible  way  of
investigating  this  contention  is  by  measuring poker  players'  personality-  and/or
temperament traits,  and  assessing  their associations with poker experience  (see Brown &
Mitchell,  2010).  Personality-  and temperament  traits  are  known to be  to  a  large extent
stable across time. Therefore, any association – or lack thereof – between these traits and
poker  experience  would  provide  consequential information  concerning causal  relations
between poker experience and emotion regulation13. It also needs to be noted that the above
13 Some  preliminary  evidence  already  exists.  Results  from  an  unpublished  study (Palomäki  et  al.,  
unpublished data) showed a significant negative correlation between the personality trait of emotionality 
(in the HEXACO model of personality; Ashton & Lee, 2009) and poker experience (as measured by PES).
This finding arguably supports the assumption that acquiring poker experience does not by and of itself 
result in changes in emotion regulation abilities.
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contentions are not mutually exclusive – it is possible that playing poker at the same time
“teaches” emotion regulation,  and that players  who are adept in  emotion regulation are
more likely to continue playing poker than those who are inept in it.
Systematic selection bias for certain types of participants might have been introduced in
Studies I–III. For example, in Studies I and II, some participants publicly stated on poker
web forums that they were suspicious about the scientific motivation behind the study, and
would thus boycott the survey. In addition, some participants complained about the length
of the survey used in Study II, and stated that they left it unanswered. Moreover, in Study
II, the poker decision making tasks could have been effectively solved by employing a
variety of statistical software specifically tailored for poker decision making analysis.
The present thesis introduced a number of new psychometric scales (in Study III) aimed
at  measuring  various  emotional  characteristics  implicated  in  tilting  behavior.  Thus,  the
psychometric properties of these scales  have not been thoroughly  evaluated.  A possible
venue for further research is to assess the associations between, for example, emotional
sensitivity to losses and non-poker gambling behavior (e.g., playing slot-machines, sports
betting, or buying lottery tickets). If the scales (such as the SL -scale) can be employed to
predict detrimental out-of-control decision making during other forms of gambling besides
poker, then it is reasonable to presume the  psychometric properties of the scales (and by
extension,  the  phenomenon  of  tilting)  have wider  relevance  in  understanding  human
gambling behavior  (see also  Brown et al., 2004;  Moodie & Finnigan, 2005; Teed et al.,
2012).
In  Study  IV,  the  observed  differences  in  EDA between  poker  game  actions  were
relatively  modest.  Although  the  LMM  method  has  many  advantages,  an  obvious
disadvantage  is  the  lack  of  well-established means  for  estimating effect  sizes.  For  that
reason, no unambiguous index of effect size could be provided. It can thus be argued that
the observed modest differences in EDA, although statistically highly significant, might not
be subjectively easily distinguishable (i.e., they might not have “practical” significance in
predicting poker decision making).
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The modest differences in EDA between actions might relate to a lack of ecological
validity in the study design. The modified version of the game did not accurately resemble
the  poker  games  players  usually  play  on-line.  Ecological  validity  can  be  increased  by
employing more recognizable poker software (e.g., poker game interfaces used in popular
on-line  poker  sites),  and by having participants  play  for  real  money prizes,  instead  of
movie-tickets.  Ecological  validity  of  the  distribution  of  poker  hand  strengths  could  be
increased also by increasing the number of hands played, and by decreasing the percentage
of strong starting hands – many participants thought that they were being dealt too many of
them (see also Dedonno & Detterman, 2008). 
It should also be noted that the participants in  Study IV were all novice poker players
with little experience in NLHE.  Furthermore, in  the experiment of  Study IV, participants
played on one virtual poker table. It is very common for active on-line poker players to play
on multiple  tables  at  once (e.g.,  Rhodes,  2010).  Assessing poker  decision making in  a
laboratory setting while participants play on multiple tables at once is a possible venue for
future  research.  Thus,  in  order  to  further  integrate  the  findings  from  Studies  I–IV,  a
laboratory  experiment  is  suggested.  At  least  the  following  factors  in  a  poker  decision
making task should be considered and/or manipulated: i) number of tables played on, ii)
level of poker experience (e.g., as measured by PES), iii) characteristics related to emotion
regulation (e.g., as measured by personality- and/or temperament traits, or by the measures
presented in this thesis), and iv) psychophysiological measures of emotional reactivity (e.g.,
EDA).  Based on the  findings  of  the  current  thesis,  it  is  reasonable to  hypothesize  that
experienced  poker  players,  as  compared  with less  experienced  ones, are  better  able  to
regulate their emotions,  and that this ability is reflected in decreased EDA during poker
decision making. Furthermore, it is reasonable to presume that playing on multiple tables at
once  is  less  likely  to  have  a  detrimental  effect  on the  decision  making  accuracy  of
experienced players, as compared with less experienced ones.
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5.5 A note on problem gambling
The current thesis did not assess participants' problem (or disordered) gambling. The aims
of Studies I–IV were purely non-pathological. Arguably, tilting cannot be defined a priori
as a pathology due to a large proportion of poker players who sometimes tilt.  Tilting is,
however, also defined by behaviors often associated with problem gambling, such as losing
control and chasing.  Due to this, it  is  conceivable that  an association between problem
gambling and tilting severity exists. Excessive tilting, in particular, under certain conditions
appears to  be  isomorphic  with  problematic gambling  behavior  (see  Rosecrance,  1986;
Williams et al., 2012). Therefore, individuals suffering from disordered gambling might be
at  a  high risk of severe tilting,  and the consequences thereof might be especially perilous
for these individuals.
At least two earlier studies employing ethnography have evaluated the relationship
between  tilting  and  problem  gambling.  Rosecrance  (1986)  identified  tilting  behavior
resulting from bad beats in racetrack bettors, and concluded that tilting often was the main
impetus for the development of problematic gambling behavior. In contrast, Browne (1989)
observed gamblers' (mainly poker players) behavior in legal commercial card parlors and at
open Gamblers Anonymous meetings. He contended that  although all gamblers described
having experienced  tilting,  it  was  their emotional  reactions  –  which  could  be  mild  or
agitated  –  to tilt  and  tilt-inducing  situations that determined whether  or  not  gambling
became  problematic.  This  contention is  also  in  line,  to  some  extent,  with  the  results
presented in  the current  thesis.  Notwithstanding, the appearance  of isomorphism between
tilting and problem gambling alone does not allow concluding that a meaningful association
between the two necessarily exists. Further research is needed to evaluate these claims. 
Assessing the associations between problem gambling and tilting severity is  ostensibly
straightforward,  and  could  be achieved  by  a  correlative  study  paradigm  employing
standardized questionnaire measures.  In order to assess the connection between problem
gambling  and  tilting  behavior,  standardized  methods  for  measuring  problem  gambling
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(such as the South Oaks Gambling Screen, SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 1987; or the Problem
Gambling Severity  Index,  PGSI;  Ferris  &  Wynne,  2001;  Holtgraves,  2009) need to  be
employed. However, evidence suggests that these commonly used methods for measuring
pathological aspects of gambling are ill-equipped to assess a poker playing population –
especially in the case of experienced poker players, who play for long hours and/or as a
means to make money (e.g., Bjerg, 2010). For example, a professional or semi-professional
poker player measured with SOGS might be labeled a “problem gambler” despite having a
high level of both well-being and financial agency. In other words, the concepts of “poker
experience” and “problem gambling” are entangled, and it is cumbersome to assess their
causal association (see also McCormack et al., 2013; Shead et al., 2008; Weinstock et al.,
2013).
Preliminary data from three separate Internet-based correlative studies suggest that while
poker  experience is  positively associated with problem gambling (as measured by both
SOGS and PGSI), there is no association between poker experience and satisfaction in life
or social well-being (Palomäki et al., unpublished data). In other words, experienced poker
players are more likely to exhibit pathological gambling behavior  but no more likely to
report  lower levels  of  general  well-being,  as  compared  with  inexperienced  players
(well-being was measured by scales such as The Trait Hope Scale [Snyder et al., 1991], and
The Life Satisfaction Scale [Diener et al., 1985]). These results challenge the validity of the
SOGS  and  PGSI  in  assessing  pathological  aspects  of  gambling  in  experienced  poker
players. The results also suggest that the concepts of problem gambling,  tilting and poker
experience need to be properly disentangled before further conjectures regarding them can
be made.
At  present,  Western  psychiatry  is,  arguably,  still  not  fully  able  to  provide  an
unambiguous definition of mental illness that would appear consistent over larger historical
periods and/or cultural boundaries (e.g., Perring, 2010). It is also worth noting that there is
no  proper  universally  accepted  theory  of  what  mental  health  essentially  is  (see  Nesse,
2005a, 2005b; Williams & Nesse, 1994). Furthermore, because tilting is a very prevalent
phenomenon among poker players, it might represent a “normal” emotional reaction to a
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loss of resources – similarly, it is “normal” to react with anger when facing injustice (by,
e.g., having someone steal your money). 
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6 CONCLUSIONS
This thesis sought out to produce new knowledge on the multifaceted phenomena of poker
decision making and emotional processes therein, as existing knowledge on this topic was
primarily anecdotal. First, the phenomenology and aetiology of emotions related to losing
were qualitatively explored, thereby providing an empirical framework against which later
scientific studies on the same subject matter could be evaluated. Second, evidence from two
correlative studies provided support for the notion that poker playing experience is closely
related  to  both  poker  decision  making  accuracy  and  emotion  regulation  abilities  (i.e.,
mental game skills, or emotional “maturity”). Third, evidence from a psychophysiological
laboratory experiment demonstrated that EDA is closely associated with emotion-related
processes implicated in NLHE poker decision making, thus placing  the game within the
context of current neuroscientific and economic decision making theories, namely the SMH
and EUT. Finally,  when a proposed hypothesis was not supported  by the data, alternative
interpretations for the observation were offered, and suggestions for further research were
identified and closely examined.
The combined results contribute to existing knowledge on i) the general underpinnings
of the  tilting  phenomenon,  ii) the associations between poker playing experience,  poker
playing  skill, and  various  emotional  characteristics  implicated  in  emotion  regulation
abilities, iii) psychophysiological reactivity during NLHE poker decision making.
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL ANALYSES
A1 Factor loadings on the pooled items of PEET, ST and PES
Table 6. Factor loadings (direct oblimin rotation) on the pooled 11 items of Perceived Effect of Experience on
Tilting (PEET; Factor 1;  items 1–4), Severity of  Tilting (ST; Factor 2;  items 5–8),  and Poker  Experience
Scale (PES; Factor 3; items 9–11) on the first three factors. Loadings ≥ 0.55 are highlighted
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Factor loadings
Pooled items of PEET (1–4), ST (5–8) and PES (9–11)
Factor
1 2 3
.065 .657 .121
-.020 -.740 .018
.018 -.655 -.073
-.074 .799 -.099
.795 -.021 .022
.964 .133 -.096
.853 -.005 -.041
.652 -.148 .147
9. How many years have you played poker? .068 .008 .764
.020 -.017 .785
11. At what level of stakes do you usually play? -.070 .060 .561
Eigenvalues 3.37 2.85 1.41
% explained 30.69 25.96 12.83
Cumulative % explained 30.69 56.65 69.48
1. How many times have you tilted within your last 6 months 
of active poker playing?
2. If you have tilted (within your last 6 months of active 
poker playing), on estimate how strong was the tilting in your 
experience?
3. When I have tilted (within my last active 6 months of poker 
playing), I have managed to quit playing before the losses 
have become too big.
4. Tilting has been a problem for me (within my last active 6 
months of playing).
5. The more poker playing experience I have accumulated, 
the less frequently I have tilted.
6. The more poker playing experience I have accumulated, 
the shorter lasting my periods of tilting have been.
7. The more poker playing experience I have accumulated, 
the less “intensive” my periods of tilting have been.
8. The more poker playing experience I have accumulated, 
the less I have felt tilting is a problem for me.
10. What is the rough estimate of how many poker hands you 
have played during your life?
A2 Exploratory analyses
According  to  the  results  of  Study  II  concerning poker  decision  making  accuracy,
experienced  poker  players  benefit  from  self-reflection,  whereas  inexperienced  players
benefit from self-rumination. Thus, at some point in time during poker skill development,
poker players apparently benefit from “switching” from self-ruminative to self-reflective
tendencies. 
An exploratory analysis was performed to evaluate the hypothesis proposed in the main
text, according to which the aforementioned “switch”  might occur when players pursue
moving up in the stakes.  It is conceivable that a subgroup of poker players exists who,
despite having played for many years and a substantial amount of poker hands, have failed
at acquiring the level of skill required to play at the higher stakes. Poker experience scale
(PES) includes three items, two of which assess the  amount of years  and the  number of
poker hands played, and one that assesses the level of stakes players currently played at. In
the data of Study II, the aforementioned subgroup of players would be represented by those
participants who played at low stakes despite having scored high on the  remaining two
items of PES.
Thus, a new two-item scale (PES-2) was first formed that included only the “amount of
years played” and “number of poker hands played” PES items.  Thereafter, simple slopes
analysis with “level of stakes” as the moderator was employed to assess the association
between PES-2 and self-reflection. All variables were centered and standardized.
A2.1 Results and discussion
Figure 10 and table 7 show that self-reflection as a function of level of stakes is expressed
differently  at  different  levels  of  PES-2.  However,  no  significant  differences  in
self-reflective tendencies were observed in high stakes players with low versus high PES-2
scores.  Therefore,  the hypothesis  presented in the main text  was only partly supported.
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Regardless, these results  might imply that  a specific subgroup of poker players with high
PES-2 scores are “stuck at the lower limits” due to insufficient self-reflective abilities.
Figure 10. Association between standardized PES-2 and Self-Reflection scores in high versus low Level of
stakes. Simple slopes are one standard deviation above and below the mean. Only the slop for low Level of
stakes (-1SD) is statistically significant.
Table 7. Multiple regression analysis presenting the main effect, interaction effect and simple slopes analysis
of PES-2 and Level of stakes on Self-Reflection
Standard  multiple regression
statistics
Simple slopes  with “Level of stakes”
as the moderator
Model B t p  Slope B t p
PES-2 –0.13 –2.04 <.05 −1SD –0.28 –3.62 <.001
Level of stakes 0.05 0.83 n.s.
PES-2 x Level of stakes 0.15 2.97 <.01 +1SD 0.02 0.31 n.s.
Note. Grey background  color  denotes a statistically significant effect.  PES-2 = two-item Poker Experience
Scale.
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